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GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS: PUNISHING 
CHARACTER, EQUALITY AND THE IRRELEVANCE 




In my second year of law school I had to move. This was difficult 
because I had to maneuver a large unwieldy van through the streets of 
midtown Manhattan. Unwilling to shoulder the load alone I inveigled a 
friend, a Yale Law School student, also Black, to help. 
I was uneasy about navigating the truck about town. Charting the 
chaotic traffic was taxing on the nerves. My worst fears were realized 
when I felt a bump at the rear of the truck. I had been hit. 
My first thoughts were practical: the amount of insurance coverage 
purchased for the truck, points on my license, the delay. The irate taxi 
driver, an Arab-American, appeared at my window and began to shout 
at my fnend and me for causing the accident. Though not blameless, I 
hardly felt completely at fault and began to defend myself. Suddenly, 
with lights and a short burst of the siren, a police car materialized. 
Another, driving across our path, spotted its brethren and stopped to 
assist. Quickly the street was filled with flashing lights and audible 
police radios. My heart sank. I looked across the seat at my friend, and 
immediately saw the profile; two Black men, dirty from a day's worth 
of moving, in the city at night. 
A police officer approached my door and began to speak. 
Interrupting him I unthinkingly said, "Sorry, officer, I was just trying to 
move tonight, but my friend and I had to stop by the law firm to pick up 
* This article was written in large part during my year as a Columbia University Law and 
Philosophy Research Fellow/Legal Discourse Fellow. I owe thanks for the support of Dean 
David Leebron and Professor Jeremy Waldron. Thanks are further owed to Professor Steven 
Sheppard, Professor Russell Christopher for his numerous revisions and critiques, Dr. Jeremy 
Horder for his valuable criticisms and Professor John Gardner. My thanks go to Professor 
George P. Fletcher without whose support on every level this piece would not have been written. 
•* Associate, Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP. B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Columbia 
University; B.C.L., Oxford University. This article and the opinions expressed herein are those 
of the author and in no way reflect those of Boies, Schiller & Flexner. 
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his bag." Though nervous, I was conscious of speaking in a measured, 
deferential voice. The taxi driver, in contrast, launched into loud 
accusations, his English easily understood but broken and marred by a 
heavy accent. 
The police officer immediately chided the driver for interrupting 
and, turning to me, asked, "What happened here? I muttered something 
about trying to pull out into traffic and trailed off. The cop nodded 
knowingly, as though I had said something sensible, and pronounced to 
the fuming driver, "Well, you must have hit him." The enraged driver 
tried to protest but the officer replied with a dubious proposition. "The 
paint is on the back of his truck so you must have been the one who hit 
him." Despite the driver's attempts to plead his case, the officer and 
each subsequent officer, casually dismissed him, rebuffing him with 
their own hastily drawn theory of the driver's fault Each time I recall 
that evening, I remember the discomfort I felt watching the treatment of 
the driver. I remember knowing that there was nothing he could say to 
solicit the compassion of the men in blue. A judgment had been 
rendered: 1 was in the right and his protests would gain no sympathy. 
I did not have to say much to explain my part in the accident. 
Once the police had decided 1 was "the good guy" and the foreigner was 
"the bad guy," the rest of their judgment about fault in the accident 
naturally followed. 1 had understood this on some intuitive level even 
as the police approached. It is near impossible to grow up as an 
Afiican-American and not become keenly aware of the dynamics and 
necessity of social signaling, especially with the police. The need to 
position oneself as a good guy is understood. 
Quite without thinking, the first few words out of my mouth had 
been aimed at signaling my position and status. The mildly apologetic 
words, the diction and meter, the use of the word "officer"; all indicated 
to the police that 1 was a fine, upstanding citizen. The explicit reference 
to my friend's position at a law firm was an important, though 
unconscious cue, to locate me within the realm of the established. 
The foreign taxi driver could not engage in the same cue-giving 
exercises. His tone and accent prevented him from establishing a 
common front with the police. 
This episode in my life now returns as a theory about criminal law. 
This article explores the problem of punishing character.' I argue that 
1 The opening narrative illustrates intuitive reasoning about good guys and bad guys. Once 
an assumption is made about the relative virtue of the characters in a conflict, determinations of 
guilt, blame and punishment flow naturally. By differentiating between the good and the bad, we 
decide who is truthful and who untrustworthy, who is innocent and who blameworthy. 
Criminal law is prone to the same dangers. The criminal law is drawn to assessing the 
underlying character of offenders. After this assessment, consequences of guilt and punishment 
follow namrally. Bad guys or bad characters deserve punishment based on their immoral 
character. 
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punishing offenders because they are bad people^ is unjust in the same 
way that that the Arab-American driver on the street was treated 
unjustly. He fit the profile of the bad guy and suffered as a result. This 
article reflects the danger of premising our justification of punishment 
on another's character. The end of my reflections will be to rediscover 
and demonstrate the critical importance of the act requirement in the 
criminal law.^ I conclude with a plea to treat the criteria of criminal 
The image of bad guys also creates a distinction between criminals and other members of 
society. Many see criminals as possessing the sum of all the moral faults we condemn. The 
offender represents all our immoral temptations. Conceiving the criminal as an immoral other 
erects a complete separation, erasing the notion of the offender's common humanity. Absent this 
image of common humanity, punishment is freed of any constraints. 
Measuring criminal punishment by immoral character does more than segregate the 
offender. Character judgments tum this separation from society into a permanent banishment. 
Judgments about the criminal become fixed, an image of permanent immoral character. 
This image of immoral character is first found in Aristotle. Today's penal practices 
manifest this view of permanent immoral character defects in criminal offenders. Such practices 
include punishment regimes like "Three Strikes and Out," permanent disenfranchisement and 
other collateral punishments. 
The drive to punish for character means the law must find a way of assessing character. In 
order to unearth a criminal offender's character, philosophers and theorists link criminal acts to 
underlying bad character. Early examples are found in the work of David Hume. Modem 
character theorists like Joel Feinberg, George Fletcher, Robert Nozick, Michael Bayles, Nicola 
Lacey, George Vuoso and Richard Brandt also propose that punishment should be for character 
defects revealed in criminal acts. 
2 Here "bad guys" is used as a colloquial moniker to denote people of immoral character. 
The allusion is to the cinematic criminal villain. In this sense bad guy is directly equivalent to 
bad character. 
3 For a basic treatment of the actus reus, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Actus Reus, in 1 THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 15 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). Dan-Cohen explores 
the importance of the actus reus as a bulwark against both punishing people based on their 
intrinsic undesirability and on basing criminal punishment on the underlying intentions of the 
accused. In discussing the temptations to move away from the act requirement, Dan-Cohen 
notes: 
Certain attitudes or beliefs. . . might be the target of punishment because they [are] 
considered, in and of themselves, too repugnant to be tolerated. .. [Ojther 
developments, notably the rationalization of criminal liability as predicated on the 
defendant's dangerousness and culpability, have made modem law more hospitable to 
the idea of punishing ... for mere intentions. The subjectivist view of culpability 
increasingly taken by the criminal law leads to the conclusion that extemal factors, 
including the accused's actual conduct, may be of great probative value as to what his 
intentions really were, but these factors no longer constitute the grounds for 
liability.... 
Id at 17. The author defines actus reus as not only a part of the total criminal offense, but also 
the portion of the offense on which criminal punishment is predicated. As Dan-Cohen points out, 
this facet of the actus reus contrasts with the impulse to base criminal punishment on status or 
permanent moral character: 
[I]t could be argued to the contrary [of the status offenses] that punishment for a single 
act is justified only if it reveals something of permanence about the defendant's 
character. Indeed, when an act is strongly influenced by overwhelming extemal 
circumstances, thus reflecting little of the agent's own moral character, the criminal 
law tends to exculpate by means of various excuses .... 
Id. at 21 (emphasis added). But see Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in 
ANTHONY DUFF, PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1998). 
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liability in a new liberal spirit. 
I. HEROES AND VILLAINS—MAINTAINING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
THE GOOD AND THE BAD 
Popular culture and common intuition make sense of the world 
through simple divisions. Our collective stories divide the world into 
good guys and bad guys. Everything from world wars to personal 
struggles are recast in this light. In this section I will explore communal 
myths about good guys and bad guys. These myths are retold in 
popular medium; film is a primary example. Eventually, these myths 
evolve to incorporate greater moral complexity. The theater of criminal 
law, however, maintains the simplistic distinction. The law assesses the 
respective virtues and vices of those before it in order to maintain this 
division. By holding on to heroes and villains, the law justifies 
punishment and suppresses the common humanity of criminal 
offenders.'* 
The simplistic understanding of the good guys and bad guys lies at 
the foundation of our culture, perhaps all cultures. Movies and comic 
books introduce the young to this basic conception of the way we live. 
Movies and other pop culture stories have traditionally been modem 
morality plays. Their stmcture has a binary simplicity. In the Westerns, 
a bank is robbed or an innocent town invaded. In the 1930s gangster 
movies, the bad guys are men of avarice. The crime boss is interested 
in beating the racket and outwitting the cops. He rules over the 
neighborhood with an iron fist. He orders his heavies to squelch and 
intimidate anyone who gets in the way. The scene of the gangster, 
handling the frail, old shopkeeper by the lapels—"You'll fall in line if 
you know what's good for you"—tells the viewer who is decent and 
who is not. 
The good guys are committed by duty and honor to stop the bad 
guys. They must defend the good, the tme, and the beautiful. Though 
the odds are always against them, they race to unravel the mystery, save 
the damsel and capture the villain. Most importantly, they are without 
moral flaw. Though they must put their own life in danger, they never 
hesitate or question their path. They simply understand that the world 
must be protected and the bad guys punished. 
There could only be two endings for the bad guy. First, a la Bogart 
heavy, he could be undone by his own moral failing. His greed could 
lead him to death in pursuit of the treasure or his power lust to a deadly 
4 Thinking of criminal offenders in the same way as cinematic villains reduces them to 
simple moral caricature. Without any moral complexity it becomes easy to disavow the humanity 
of the offender and to ignore any commonality. See supra text accompanying footnotes 16-21. 
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double cross.^ More commonly, however, he would simply meet defeat 
at the hands of the hero. It was inevitable. The audience always knew 
the villain would lose because he was the villain. Even if it was not 
some distinct moral flaw that toppled him, he would fail nonetheless. 
His being the bad guy was enough to justify his failure and 
punishment.^ 
Films illustrate the classic division between the good guys and the 
bad guys. The frontier marshal in the white hat faces down "los 
banditos." By knowing who the good guy is we know who to cheer for 
and against. Lex Luthor is a bad guy. Superman is a good guy. 
Likewise, criminal trials replicate the structure we have known since 
childhood. Officer Fuhrman is a bad guy. Johnnie Cochran is a good 
guy.'' We know who is good and just and who is evil and deserving of 
punishment. 
A. Film Noir: Undermining Moral Certainty 
Of course, these simplistic divisions cannot long stand up to the 
complexities of life or the change in dramatic styles. The recognition of 
moral complexity led to greater sophistication of moral judgment in 
film. Nineteen-forties film noir introduced a new type of protagonist, 
one who lacked any claim to moral superiority over movie villains in 
general and even his own enemies in particular. Humphrey Bogart's 
Sam Spade was no more noble than the greedy gangsters whose treasure 
he attempted to find.® In Double Indemnity, Fred McMurray helps the 
femme fatale murder her husband for the insurance proceeds^—hardly a 
pristine hero. A classic example of the noir character is found in Fritz 
Lang's The Woman in the Window}^ Here, Edward G. Robinson plays 
a chaste college Professor, who, in pursuing a harmless flirtation, ends 
up killing Joan Bennet's enraged lover. The killing, though in self-
5 THE TREASURE OF THE SIERRA MADRE (Wamer Bros. 1948). 
® The narrative structure in which the immoral antagonist is ultimately defeated, often by 
their iriunoral characteristic, is often found in fairy tales and classic myths as well. Furthermore, 
the evildoer is not exclusively male. In many children's stories the evil stepmother has become 
the archetype of the immoral villain. See, e.g., DELLA COHEN, WALT DISNEY'S CINDERELLA: A 
READ-ALOUD STORYBOOK, (1999), adapted from JACOB GRIMM & WILHELM GRIMM, 
CHILDREN'S AND HOUSEHOLD TALES (1812); SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARVES (1999), 
adapted from GRIMM & GRIMM, supra. For more sophisticated versions of myth and morality 
plays, the Greek myths are prime examples. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY (1998). 
^ More to the point, by revealing Mark Fuhrman's repugnant racial slurs, the defense team in 
the O.J. Simpson trial recast the Los Angeles Police Department ("L.A.P.D.") as the villains and, 
by default, assumed the role of the good guys. This shifted the case to a trial of the L.A.P.D. 
rather than of O.J. Simpson. 
8 See THE MALTESE FALCON (Wamer Bros. 1941). 
9 DOUBLE INDEMNITY (Paramount Pictures 1944). 
'0 See THE WOMAN IN THE WINDOW (Intemat'l Pictures 1944). 
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defense, leads the harmless Professor to dispose of the body, lie to his 
friends and plot a murder in order to protect his carefully balanced 
world. Finally, in desperation, the Professor is driven to suicide. 
Though the film's ending reveals that the episode was a dream, the 
lesson is clear. Not only bad people become criminals, commit 
desperate acts or display moral weakness. These moral flaws exist in 
even the most upright among us. These characters cannot claim our 
loyalty for their superior moral virtue. Rather, their moral ambiguity 
renders them truer, more interesting. Today's films follow suit, 
introducing moral complexity by showing the humanity of even the 
most devious villains. . 
The moral ambivalence of film noir was its greatest contribution. 
By revealing film heroes to be as morally flawed as any villains, film 
noir undermined the cinematic morality play. The noir private eye did 
good because he had to, not out of any sense of moral duty. The damsel 
in distress becomes the femme fatale, as manipulative a character as the 
villains of old. Nor did film noir reassure us with a comfortable ending. 
In film noir, bad things as often happened to the protagonists as good 
things happened to the antagonists. As being good was no guarantee of 
success, neither was being bad a guarantee of punishment. 
As film noir matured its moral ambivalence expanded. In later 
noir, the notion that the "good guy" was not so good inverted itself. 
Cinema began to focus on the idea that the bad guy was not so bad. In 
Terrence Malick's Badlands, a childlike young man and his girlfnend 
embark on a crime and murder spree throughout the country.'^ Yet 
throughout the movie one cannot help but be charmed by (or at least 
withhold condemnation from) the antagonist (protagonist?). His 
manner is much like a boy playing cops and robbers and one never feels 
he grasps the gravity of his killings. Bonnie and Clyde renders its title 
characters, bank robbers, stylish, glamorous and enviably cool.'^ The 
French film Le Samourai presents a still cooler murderer.His icy 
demeanor and style makes the audience admire him more than the 
authorities. Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid illustrates a pair of 
thoroughly likable bank robbers. The endearing early frame of Paul 
Newman bicycling his fellow robber's girlfriend around a sun-drenched 
yard not only charms the audience but stands in contrast to the moral 
condemnation found in earlier cinema. Most recently Anthony 
Hopkin's Hannibal has done the same by emphasizing the elegance and 
refinement of the title character, a cannibalistic murderer.'5 These 
11 See BADLANDS (Warner Bros. 1973). 
12 See BONNIE AND CLYDE (Warner Bros. 1967). 
13 See LE SAMOURAI (1967). 
14 See BUTCH CASSIDY AND THE SUNDANCE KID (Twentieth Century Fox 1969). 
15 See HANNIBAL (MOM 2001). 
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sophisticated films have exploded the idea that there are singular good 
guys and bad guys who meet a just end. 
Criminal law, however, continues to maintain the rigid dichotomy 
of good guys and bad guys. It is crucial that there be a clear allocation 
of virtue within the conflict. The state can impose punishment only if 
there is a clear dichotomy of good and evil. The state maintains the 
position of good guy. Placing the defendant within the realm of bad 
guys justifies the imposition of punishment. 
Criminal law cannot recognize the moral ambiguity of film noir. If 
the criminal defendant's common humanity or the state's moral 
uncertainty were illustrated, the state would lose its moral right to 
punish. Witness the last minute loss of nerve in the scheduled execution 
of Timothy McVeigh.'® The Federal Bureau of Investigation committed 
a blunder by failing to disclose 3000 pages of relevant material.'^ No 
one in the Justice Department or the general public thought this material 
might exonerate the confessed terrorist McVeigh, but the image of 
professional incompetence made the Justice Department feel uneasy 
about taking a life. Only the virtuous have the right to execute.'^ 
Conceptualizing the state as good and the criminal as bad does 
more than justify our imposition of punishment. Imagining criminal 
offenders as a class of bad guys, cinematic villains who are living 
threats to all us, allows us to distance ourselves from them. This image 
severs our common bond of humanity with the criminal defendants.'® 
An image of criminals as bad guys creates a fundamental 
distinction between ourselves and the criminal defendants. Like the 
villains of old, the criminal can be seen as possessing all the moral 
faults and temptations we condemn. Thinking of the criminal as a full 
person, with redeeming qualities, would force us to rethink the way we 
punish. As the incarnation of evil, the criminal becomes the perfect 
"other." 
Viewing a group of people as fundamentally different has always 
been a necessary first step in imposing mass harm. The Nazis could not 
16 See David Johnston, Citing F.B.I. Lapse, Ashcroft Delays McVeigh Execution, N.Y. TIMES 
M a y  1 2 ,  2 0 0 1 ,  a t  A l .  
See id. 
18 One illustration of the division of virtue between the State and the offender is found in the 
the law of search and seizure's exclusionary rule. This rule prohibits the State from introducing 
illegally attained evidence in a criminal prosecution. Further, under the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine, the State may not use any evidence that was gathered as a result, or "fruit," of the 
original improperly attained evidence. The prohibition stems from the idea that when the State 
has also dirtied its hands, it loses its authority to condemn the offender. Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); see also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
19 The complicated conception in film noir severs our common bond with the victim as well. 
Noir erases the easy dichotomy between villains and victims. We are left with various people and 
impulses to weigh. Some may be more sympathetic, some may deserve protection, but they are 
never unifaceted good guys and bad guys. Noir films, by undermining the moral certainty of 
earlier cinema, in some ways preserved the humanity of all characters. 
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have systematically murdered Jews without first reconceptualizing them 
as sub-human. One of the important roles of the concept of race in 
securing subordination is establishing an inherent distinction between 
people. Conceiving the criminal as the "other" blunts our concem for 
him in meting out punishment. To the extent the criminal is viewed as 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  t h a n  o n e s e l f ,  c o m p a s s i o n  i s  l e s s  l i k e l y O n e  i s  
not restrained by the notion that she may one day find herself in a 
similar position. Viewing criminals as the other means being able to 
erect a complete separation and erase all empathy. 
B. Good Guys and Bad Guys: The Motivation to Assess Character in 
the Criminal Law 
Until now the focus of this article has been on the colloquial 
distinction between good guys and bad guys. The purpose of this 
rhetoric has been to avoid technical philosophical jargon that as often 
obscures as enlightens. It is important, however, to ground the 
discussion in the contemporary literature. Criminal theory is replete 
with discussions describing criminal punishment as premised on the 
desire to punish bad people.^' The key word is "character." The 
literature links criminal acts to underlying character defects. Bad 
character is compelling for the same intuitive reasons that bad guys 
suffer in popular culture.^^ Those with bad character get what they 
deserve. 
There is an additional reason why questions of character have 
become increasingly important in the arena of criminal law. With the 
growth of inchoate crimes, criminal intentions need not be evidenced in 
either harm or manifestly dangerous conduct.^^ Instead, a nominally 
innocent act combined with some malicious intent is enough to create 
criminal liability. Consider the example of the would-be assassin who 
puts sugar in his intended victim's coffee cup.^'^ He thinks that the 
20 The lack of any empathy when viewing those marked to be punished is itself dangerous. 
Absent some sense of the offender's humanity there remains no check on the type of socially 
sanctioned cruelties such as those embodied in the Eighth Amendment. Historical examples, the 
Holocaust and Slavery, illustrate the horrific possibilities when the common humanity of groups 
erode. 
21 Criminal theorists display the underlying impulse to punish bad people by linking criminal 
acts to the fundamentally bad character of the criminal offender. For examples of the rich 
literature on character theory, see infra notes 55-68. 
22 Criminal law theorists are compelled to propose punishing bad character for the same 
reasons that society is attracted to punishing bad people. See supra note 1. 
23 The growth of inchoate crimes is illustrated in MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (2003). 
24 For a discussion of impossible attempts and their relationship with the criminal mind, see 
Booth V. State, 398 P.2d 863 (Okla. Crim. App. 1964). But for an altemative view asserting that 
impossible attempts be should judged by a "rational motivation" test, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, 
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white substance is arsenic and his intent to kill, but the observable act of 
putting sugar in coffee provides no evidence of the criminal intent.25 If 
the act does not manifest the intent to kill, what alternative sources of 
evidence are there? If there is no overt act, and absent all standard 
modes of proof (confessions, for example), any prosecution must 
establish the intention by circumstantial evidence. Among these 
incriminating circumstances one stands out: the character of the 
suspect.26 Bad people are likely to have bad intentions. If the 
prosecution can prove that the defendant is a bad person, if, in 
particular, he is a murderous person, the jury is likely to believe that he 
intended to kill. 
These things point to the motivation of the criminal law to include 
assessments of character. To summarize, the first reason for 
maintaining a sharp distinction between good guys and bad guys is to 
vindicate the state's right to punish. The second reason is to overcome 
our natural human compassion. The entire practice of conviction and 
punishment requires this dual inference from the moral gap between the 
good and the bad. Only the virtuous can punish the wicked. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PUNISHING CHARACTER 
Once conclusions about character are drawn, these judgments 
become fixed. Character too easily becomes a permanent concept. This 
means that criminals, those with poor character, are likely to be thought 
of as remaining criminal for life. The significance of that classification 
is that one cannot remove herself from it. Immoral character is 
conceived of as an inelastic concept. The desire to punish villains can 
be satisfied only by continuously punishing that class of immoral 
characters, creating a permanent criminal caste.^'^ 
To be sure, the argument is not that character never changes, or 
even that society views character as unfailingly absolute. If pressed, 
anybody might agree that a particular person can change his or her 
RETHINKING THE CRIMINAL LAW 161 (1978). 
25 See FLETCHER, supra note 24, at 161. 
26 Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1476-78 (1995). While 
Huigens locates the blameworthiness of an inchoate crime in the character of the offender there is 
no reason that there should not be an equally telling reciprocal relationship. 
27 The concept of punishing criminals for a fundamental defect of character leads to the 
image of a permanent immoral caste. While the same implications could follow from punishing 
solely for criminal acts, it is hard to imagine the same conception of permanent taint following 
from pimishment premised on acts. Although offenders can be considered criminal based on acts 
alone, the concept of permanent membership in criminal caste follows from linking punishment 
to the enduring character of the offender. As this article will explore in following sections, a 
permanent view of intrinsic criminality does not naturally follow from punishment premised on 
acts. See in/ra text accompanying notes 156-229. 
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character. On the whole, however, character is typically viewed as a 
stable collection of traits. The conventional view is that a person's 
character is fixed. 
The conventional view of character mirrors Aristotle's view, which 
conceived of immoral character as a permanent trait. Aristotle argued 
that every person chooses to develop good or bad character through 
autonomous actions. Once a person chose their character, however, he 
or she was not free to simply undo the choice.^^ The chosen character 
becomes fixed: 
[People] are themselves by their slack lives responsible for becoming 
men of that kind, and men make them themselves responsible from 
being unjust or self-indulgent. ... Yet it does not follow that if he 
wishes he will cease to be unjust and will be just. For neither does 
the man who is ill become well on those terms .... So, too, to the 
unjust and to the self-indulgent. . . they are unjust and self-indulgent 
voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for 
them not to be so.^® 
Immoral character, in the Aristotelian framework, is something 
like becoming an alcoholic or diseased. One lives a life that leads to 
being diseased, but once one is sick one cannot simply chose to be 
well.^" Premising criminal punishment on character means punishment 
becomes based on the idea of permanent immoral character.^' 
Current penal practices reflect the perception of criminals as a 
permanent caste of moral inferiors. The creation of a criminal caste 
leads to permanent ostracization. Modem penal law is often 
purposefully used as a method of stigmatizing and separating offenders. 
Punishments are used to reinforce stigmatization. The dominant, 
though not the sole, reason for many pimishments is to further ostracize 
the offender. The "Three Strikes and Out" penalty, the permanent 
disenffanchisement of felons and other collateral sentences are all 
examples of ways in which character-focused punishment regimes 
create a permanent class of criminal lessors. 
28 ARISTOTLE, The Nicomackean Ethics, § 1114a, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941). 
29 Id. 
30 To be sure Aristotle foeused on the voluntary nature of choosing bad character. It was the 
voluntaristic aspect that justified blaming those with character flaws. Further, for Aristotle, bad 
character was appropriate because each individual had a responsibility to be aware of their 
weaknesses and inclinations and guard against succumbing to their vices. Id. at §§ 1109-lOa. 
For an excellent discussion of this dimension of Aristotle's philosophy, see Huigens, supra note 
26, at 1446-48. 
3' To be sure, it is true that Aristotle focused on the voluntaristic nature of choosing bad 
character. It was this voluntaristic aspect that justified blaming those with immoral character. 
For Aristotle, blame was appropriate because each individual had a responsibility to be aware of 
their weaknesses and discipline themselves against succumbing to that vice. Nevertheless, once 
bad character evolves, the Aristotelian contention is that it remains fixed. Id.', see also supra text 
accompanying footnotes 82-85. 
2004] GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS 1029 
The concept of criminal offenders as permanently bad is reflected 
in the birth of penal statutes that have as their goal the lifetime 
warehousing of those decreed criminal. The draconian "Three Strikes 
and Out" sentencing regime is a prime example.^^ xhis warehousing is 
devoid of rational cost-benefit analysis. Nor is it connected to ideas 
about the proper retributivist desert of the offender.^^ Professor George 
Fletcher notes the disproportionality of the regime: "These measures 
could hardly be retributive, for they stand in clear disproportion to the 
gravity of the offenses that trigger their application . . . these sanctions 
can hardly be justified by utilitarian considerations. Of course, they 
achieve some measure of social protection, but at what cost?"^" 
The regime is premised precisely on the idea that after a third 
felony, the law need not inquire as to the proper measure of desert for 
the offense. The caliber of the felony, or indeed those preceding, are 
not to be examined. The regime shows a disregard for the desert of the 
offense itself. It reflects the growing hunger to imprison and forget, 
isolate and marginalize the criminal class. The sentencing regime has 
as its premise the notion that bad people will not change.^^ 
The widespread American practice, accepted largely without 
controversy, of disenfi-anchising felons also reflects a conception of 
permanent taint.^^ In the vast majority of states felons serving jail time 
are prohibited from voting.^^ In some jurisdictions this disability is 
permanent.3^ Yet, disenfi-anchisement is difficult to justify under either 
a retributivist or utilitarian paradigm. 
What then is the rationale for the disenfranchisement of felons? 
The ostensible rationale is that felons represent a threat to the voting 
process.39 It is hard to imagine this threat phrased in a rational sense 
(e.g., ex-felons will be more likely to interrupt the honesty of the voting 
process). There is little to suggest that the masses of ex-felons are 
scheming to commit voting fraud. Surely adequate measures can be 
32 George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses of 
Infamia, 46 UCLAL. REV. 1895, 1896 (1999). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 This is the ease insofar as the "Three Strikes and Out" regime is premised on 
circumventing specific retributivist measurements. The statute explicitly ignores the calibration 
of criminal punishment to fit the particular felony by mandating a life sentence after the third 
offense. Extreme examples of this are the ever growing stories of people who draw a life 
sentence after three minor crimes. Nor can the regime be justified under prineiples of specific 
deterrence without being premised on the idea that those being imprisoned are and will remain 
bad, crime-prone people. Perhaps "Three Strikes and Out" could be justified under principles of 
general deterrence, but this would mean accepting the terrible cost of imprisoning huge numbers 
of people and using them as an example in hopes of some social benefit. See id. 
36 Id. at 1896. 
32 Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1897. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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taken to protect the integrity of the voting process. 
Often felon disenffanchisement is justified as necessary to protect 
"the purity of the ballot box."40 Here the purity of the ballot box is 
couched in nearly metaphysical terms. There is a sense in which the 
felon is conceived of as somehow tainting the voting process. The 
image is that of a person with a permanent mark of shame. 
Though it may seem these arguments are fanciful, they are in fact 
both the common and reasoned arguments in favor of voter 
disenfranchisement.^' Alternatively, some may argue a version of 
social contract theory. Here voting is seen as a revocable privilege. 
Once the offender has committed a crime he forfeits his place in the 
polity. The analytical problems of this argument aside, it is just this 
concept of banishment that is dangerous in character-focused 
punishment.''^ This view casts the criminal as permanently outside the 
political community, forever an unworthy participant in the democratic 
exercise.''^ This view smacks of the ostracization earlier noted. 
Disenffanchisement is used as a tool of permanent stigmatization. This 
stigma is not merely a contingent effect of pursuing another policy. 
TO FLETCHER, jwpra note 24, at 1899. 
ti Id. 
42 The view of voting as a revocable privilege is rife with danger. Given its history, 
supporters of this view have an uneasy pedigree. An examination of the history of voting rights, 
both domestically and abroad, provides sufficient warning. The idea of voting as a privilege has 
been used historically to politically suppress different minorities. Antebellum American literature 
contains examples of those arguing that Blacks simply had not developed to the level where the 
government should grant the privilege of voting to them. These writers argued that Blacks would 
neither understand the vote, or the underlying political issues behind them and in any case were 
happier to have the burden of governance removed from their shoulders. The view of voting as a 
privilege also has importance in the rhetoric of oppressive regimes in their destruction of 
undesired minorities. The Nazis' gradual erosion of the civic rights of German Jews is an 
obvious and powerful example. 
Secondly, this social contract theory ignores the way disenffanchisement inherently skews 
the supposed contract. Take a town where a simple civic ordinance, a ciuTew for example, is at 
stake. This town of, say a million, is almost entirely evenly divided on the subject. When the 
issue comes to vote the curfew is passed by a single vote. The first night of the curfew some 
opposing it, having difficulty or resentment in the new state of affairs, break curfew, are 
immediately arrested and stripped of the right to vote. This happens with startling regularity for a 
few months. A year later the next vote on the subject is taken. Some of the original curfew 
supporter, the day-timers, have since changed their minds. Because of the large number of people 
disenfranchised, however, the opponents, night-timers, are unable to repeal the law, despite their 
now having the majority of opinion. By taking away the right to vote, one power block has 
established a lock on control and a convention that can now be called the "social contract." 
Disenfranchising members of the unpopular positions can artificially create an enforceable social 
contract. This is analogous to many controversial issues in the Nation today, the war on drugs 
being one obvious example. 
Lastly, the disenffanchisement of criminals reveals an intention to banish the criminal 
offender. Voting has long represented membership in the political community. The expansion of 
voting to a universal right has been an important mark of the growth modem liberal democracies. 
Disenffanchisement is the revocation of that membership. 
Jean Hampton, Punishment, Feminism, and Political Identity: A Case Study in the 
Expressive Meaning of Law, 11 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 23(1998). 
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Rather, the law is used purposefully to create a permanent mark of 
condemnation.'*'* 
It is tempting to give short shrift to the gravity of 
disenfranchisement. Many who have the right to vote do not exercise it 
at all and many who do rarely consider its weightiness. Yet mass 
disenfranchisement has grave effects. Disenfranchisement levels a 
heavy toll in African-American and other minority communities.'*^ 
Nationwide, fourteen percent of African-American males cannot vote 
due to their criminal record.'*® In some states fully a quarter of African-
American men are denied the ability to vote.'*^ 
Still, disenfranchisement is most important because it is symbolic 
of the felon's status as a member of a lower criminal class. Legal 
expressions can often be used as a way of defining who belongs to the 
polity and who is excluded.'*^ Disenfranchisement condemns not only 
the criminal act but the criminal himself, a permanent stigma to denote 
his bad character. It places the felon outside of the society, outside of 
the community and outside of the state as a whole.'*^ In Hampton's 
words, 
[bjy granting each adult the right to vote, no matter what group they 
come from in society, democratic societies have institutionally 
committed themselves to political equality... the right to vote is 
owed each person insofar as each of us is the political equal of every 
other person.®" 
Disenfranchisement communicates to the ex-felon and society at 
large that the criminal is no longer a "political equal."®* It is the legal 
equivalent of banishment.®^ 
There are other legal sanctions that are used to reinforce stigma, 
humiliation and ostracization and to communicate second-class-citizen 
status to felons.®® Collateral consequences are restrictions, often 
regulatory or administrative, that isolate or impair offenders 
permanently.®'* These include prohibiting ex-offenders from running for 
office, sitting on a jury, participating in govemment programs and 
restricting employment.®® Collateral penalties systematically exclude 
44 Id. at 36. 
45 See Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1900. 
46 See id. 
4'' See id. 
48 Hampton, supra note 43, at 36. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. at 29-30. 
51 See id. at 30. 
52 See id. 
53 See Nora Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153 (1999). 
54 See id. at 155. 
55 See id. at 158. 
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the felon from civil, economic and social participation. 
The imposition of collateral sanctions, again, implies permanent 
loss of full membership as a citizen. In the same way 
disenfranchisement excludes felons from the political community, 
collateral sanctions further marginalize ex-offenders. These sanctions 
even extend to the deprivation of social and welfare rights including 
welfare support programs, federal benefits, contracts and licenses, 
grants, and small business and educational loans.^^ In fact certain ex-
felons are denied federal monies solely meant to assist with the 
purchase of food.^"' These benefits are often crucial in preventing 
vulnerable citizens from falling beneath an acceptable threshold. Social 
and welfare benefits evidence a communal commitment to honor the 
needs of citizens. Denying these rights demonstrates that this concern 
does not extend to the ex-offender. Once the criminal is deemed as 
having bad character, ostracization makes permanent his taint and 
blunts our human concern. 
This exclusion extends to the ex-offender's access to employment. 
Employment is conceptualized as a pre-requisite for full membership in 
modem American society.^^ The work force has become the primary 
instrument of social incorporation, indeed social position is often 
predicated on participation in the work force.^^ 
Ex-offenders, however, are excluded from a vast part of the 
workforce.^'' Ex-offenders are excluded from an array of professions, 
ranging from lawyer, bartender, nurse, barber, beautician and so on.^' 
As Nora Demleitner notes, "the exclusion of ex-offenders from vast 
segments of the labor market as a result of government regulation of 
many professions parallels the effect of restrictions on the ex-offender's 
right to contract in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."^^ 
These restrictions and the denial of governmental programs combine to 
virtually bar the felon from large segments of the work force.®^ 
None of these by themselves prove the point. It is, of course, 
possible to justify the "Three Strikes and Out" regime under an 
altemative theory. Perhaps there are other arguments for the 
disenfranchisement of ex-felons. Others may propose reasons for 
excluding felons from welfare, food programs and educational loans. 
Taken as a whole, however, it becomes apparent that all of these 
sanctions form a certain vision of the criminal. These punishments 
5® See id. 
See id. 
58 See id. at 158. 
59 See id. at 155. 
69 See id. at 156. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 156. 
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point to one way of imagining the criminal offender. Not only does the 
criminal offender betray her immoral eharacter but that character is 
permanent. The criminal's bad character places her into an inferior 
class of citizens. The offender is to be permanently locked away if 
possible. Her vote is taken away permanently, her claim to political 
equality denied. The criminal is barred from sitting on a jury, 
participating in government, sharing in social and welfare rights and 
taking full part in her economie wellbeing. A class system based on 
permanent moral inferiority makes the criminal a permanent lesser 
citizen. 
The drive to punish people among us beeause they are 
fundamentally bad leads eriminal theorists to premise punishment on 
underlying character. In order to do so, criminal acts are used to 
measure the underlying immoral character traits of the criminal 
offender. Once the immoral character is measured the assessment 
becomes ossified. The inferior moral eharacter becomes a permanent 
trait. In the same way, the punishment that is premised on this character 
seeks to permanently segregate the offender from the remainder of 
society. This view of criminal as permanent outcast is an ever-growing 
part of our current criminal law. 
III. ASSESSING CHARACTER AS AN EMPIRICAL ISSUE. 
If punishing character can lead to these extreme eonsequences, we 
must ask ourselves this basic question: How do we know that particular 
offenders have bad character? Are we just guessing or do we have 
some reliable method of assessing who the bad guys are? Scriptwriters 
ean build the definition of character into their story lines. Real life is 
not so readily reduced to heroes and villains. 
In this section I assume that determining character is an empirical 
issue and divide the methods of proof of character into two, the first 
either relying on specific acts or, in the absence of acts, inferring 
character from other circumstantial "evidence." 
Relying on criminal actions is the more conventional and 
acceptable way of proving character. The link between action and 
character arises from the union of doctrine and desire. Our doetrines 
hold that we punish only for criminal action. But our desire is to 
condemn the criminals among us. This tension is resolved by linking 
bad acts to bad character. Bad acts are evaluated as providing evidence 
of bad character. A good example of this linkage is found in Hume.®'' 
Hume asserted that a person's actions were important only because they 
64 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 411 (Shelby-Bigge ed., 1978) (1739). 
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were connected to the person's underlying character: "[ajctions are by 
their very nature temporary and perishing.... And as it proceeded 
from nothing in him, that is dmrable or constant, and leaves nothing of 
that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account, become 
the object of punishment or vengeance."^^ 
A long list of contemporary scholars subscribe to this same 
conceptual tie between action and character. Joel Feinberg writes, "a 
person's faulty act is registerable only if it reveals what sort of person 
he is in some respect . . . Voluntary choice is a necessity only 
insofar as assuring "moral attributability" to the person's character. 
The connection of bad acts to bad character is expressed by 
modem character theorists like George Fletcher. In Rethinking 
Criminal Law, Fletcher asserts that excuses in the criminal law function 
by blocking the inference of an act to the character of the actor.^^ The 
implicit claim is that this inference, from act to character, grounds 
criminal (and moral) culpability. For Fletcher, criminal punishment is 
only just to the extent it is based on the desert of the criminal offender: 
An inference from the wrongful act to the actor's character is 
essential to a retributive theory of punishment. ... (1) Punishing 
wrongful conduct is just only if the punishment is measured by the 
desert of the offender, (2) The desert of the offender is gauged by his 
character—i.e. the kind of person he is, (3) and therefore, a 
judgment about character is essential to the just distribution of 
punishment.^^ 
The act is useful only to judge the offender's character. Fletcher 
continues, "the question becomes whether a particular wrongful act is 
attributable either to the actor's character or to circumstances which 
overwhelmed his capacity for choice ... 
Robert Nozick also follows the contours of Fletcher's position. 
Nozick believes that a criminal offender is judged by the defect in 
character that his act betrays. The character flaw opens the offender to 
"moral instmction."^^ The criminal act is used as evidence to determine 
the moral qualities of the offender's character. Again exploring the 
matter of legal excuses, he writes: "[ejxcuses show an act is not to be 
attributed to a defect in character... If we punish acts only that stem 
from some or another character defect, then it appears that the crucial 
component is the defect of character."'^' While Nozick places the actual 
65 Id. at bk. 2, pt. 3, sec. II. 
66 JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 126 (1970). 
67 FLETCHER, supra note 24, at 800-04. For a fuller exploration of excuse as the inversion of 
inculpation, see Huigens, supra note 26, at 1437-38, 1444. 
68 Id. at 800. 
69 Id. at 801. 
70 ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 381 (I98I). 
71 Id. at 383. 
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locus of punishment in the "flouting of correct values" it is clear that the 
action importantly reflects the person's character. 
The critical facet of these theories is the attempt to deduce and 
locate culpability on underlying moral character from evidence of acts. 
Other theorists underscore the importance of this inference. Michael 
Bayles proposes that blame and punishment are not directly levied for 
criminal acts but only for the character traits they reveal.''^ Nicola 
Lacey asserts that moral blame is appropriate only for actions that 
reveal enduring personality traits, patterns or settled dispositions.''^ 
Richard Brandt suggests actions are blameworthy if they would not 
have occurred but for poor character.'''* George Vuoso argues that 
where an action results most decisively from one's character moral 
blame is appropriate.''^ Nor are these antiquated views of the nature of 
criminal pimishment. Kyron Huigens makes this link most clearly, 
explicitly asserting that inculpation and criminal punishment are levied 
in condemnation of a defendant's practical reasoning and the character 
it reveals.'® Recently Tadros reaffirmed the view that excuses, and in 
turn criminal punishment, are premised on the underlying moral 
character of the offender.'" For these theorists, acts are important 
because they reveal poor moral character and therefore ground criminal 
punishment. Acts are important because they tell us who belongs to the 
good guys and who belongs to the bad guys. 
This widely accepted thesis has its origins in Aristotle's view that 
the action is to be explained by appealing to the actor's underlying 
virtues and vices. But it is worth noting that Aristotle's theory of 
character itself leads us back to autonomous actions. In the Aristotelian 
view, the actor chooses his own character by engaging in a series of 
voluntary acts.''^ On this account, bad guys possess immoral vices 
Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, I LAW & PHIL. 5, 7-
15 (1982). Bayles views character as so important that he exceeds even the Aristotelian view that 
character is limited to the bounds of that which a person can control, either in gaining them or 
acting upon them. 
Blame and punishment are not directly for acts but for character traits. According to this 
view, 'character trait' is not, as in the Aristotelian view, restricted to traits which people can 
voluntarily control possessing or manifesting in behavior. Instead, it refers to any socially 
desirable or undesirable disposition of a person. Acts may or may not indicate character traits. If 
an act does indicate an undesirable character trait, then blame is appropriate; if it does not, then 
blame is inappropriate although measures to prevent such conduct in the future might be taken. 
73 NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 
65-68 (1988). 
74 RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL 
ETHICS 465-74(1959). 
75 George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661, 1672-74 
(1987). 
76 Huigens, supra note 26, at 1437-38. 
77 Victor Tadros, The Character of Excuse, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 495 (2001). 
78 ARISTOTLE, supra note 28, § 1113b. 
1036 C A R D O Z O  L A W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 25:3 
because they have voluntarily chosen them.^^ This means that people 
remain responsible for their own moral features. A person could, 
gradually, choose to become self-indulgent or not.^" To become just or 
not. The sum of these freely chosen vices compose an actor's state of 
It is not clear, however, that the desire to punish the wicked is 
informed by a voluntaristic conception of character. When Timothy 
McVeigh is condemned as evil, the condemnation focuses not on the 
voluntaristic origins of his actions, but rather, on his character. In the 
alternative approach toward assessing character, actions appear to have 
little relevance. The most common alternative to inferring charaeter 
from specific actions is the reliance on stereotj^es. And so it was in my 
encounter with the "foreigner" who rammed into my truck as I pulled 
out into the street. 
The examples of inferring character from stereotypes are 
everyplace. Women are irrational, ergo this woman is irrational. 
Germans are rigid, therefore this German is rigid. African-Americans 
are lazy, therefore this African-American is lazy. What stereotypes 
share is the attempt to determine traits and assess character by direct 
generalization, without evidence of acts. 
There are related but more subtle ways to infer character. Both 
verbal and non-verbal cues are often used to infer a person's character. 
When the police officer approached me, 1 instinctively understood that 
he would be searching for signals that would locate me within his 
evaluative landscape. With none of the obvious indicators used to 
signal good character available, clothing, social position or obvious 
wealth, I was hypersensitive of the assessment the officer would seek to 
make. My language, my diction and meter, spoken without accent or 
slang, were meant to signal my civic uprighteousness to the officer. 
Lest there be any doubt, the reference to working at a law firrn 
reinforced his knowledge of the social and economic position of both 
my friend and myself. 
The cab driver, in contrast, could not readily marshal the same 
verbal indicators. His position as a cab driver, his accent, his skin color 
none of these cues conveyed the message that he was the right kind of 
person." The police officers immediately branded him an outsider. 
This manner of attempting to assess character is clearly unreliable. 
It is rife with prejudice and discrimination. Even in non-legal spheres, 
in personal moral assessment, the use of stereotypes, social indicia and 
other informal methods of judgment are typically fed by harmful social 
images. Whatever the harm may be when an individual attempts to 
79 Id. 
80 Id. § 1114a. 
81 Id § 1114b. 
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infer character directly in personal roles, these inferences are personal 
failings. If an individual decides to withhold friendship from another on 
the basis of inaccurate or hasty conclusions about the other's character 
the harm is private. When these decisions have non-private 
consequences, like preclusion from jobs or housing, the effects become 
a matter of public concern. In any case, it is clear that we often premise 
rewards and punishments, both personal and communal, on attempts to 
assess character. 
Let us be clear on the contention. The character view of law holds, 
at its heart, that a person is punished for criminal acts by virtue of what 
they reveal about their character. In turn, criminal punishment is a 
proxy for punishing immoral character. This view is reinforced by our 
desire for moral simplicity in leveling criminal punishment and is 
evidenced in our growing urge to construct, maintain and punish a 
permanent class of immoral felons. 
Yet criminal punishment is an ill-conceived proxy for punishing 
character. First the epistemic difficulties in discerning character may be 
insurmountable. More fundamentally, punishing for immoral character 
is illegitimate and in tension with the ideals of equality in the liberal 
state. We ought not seek to punish for immoral character in and of 
itself. More demanding still, we should not allow character to become 
constitutive of the way in which wrongs are defined or to play a part in 
deciding whether a legal excuse is merited.^^ 
A. From Acts to Character: The Epistemological Flaws in Assessing 
Character 
Assessing the character of a person in real life is obviously far 
more complicated than assigning accepted labels of heroes and villains 
in film and in literature. Inferring character from criminal actions is 
unreliable and relying upon a single criminal act particularly uncertain. 
Often two identical acts spring from vastly different character traits. 
One man may steal to feed his family; another out of entirely malicious 
motives. Though the acts appear identical the respective characters are 
different. The act tells us nothing about the character. 
Moreover, even the same action may communicate little 
objectively about underlying character. To some, a soldier who refuses 
an order will seem to display cowardice or insolence. To others, he may 
seem brave in standing up to his commanding officer, especially if the 
orders are factually or morally suspect. Further, there is no guarantee 
^2 I am thankful to Dr. J. Herder in noting the earlier equivocations in the implications of my 
central critique. 
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that a person's actions are linked to the traits with which we intuitively 
associate them. Professor Michael Moore notes the extreme example of 
Bulstrode in Middlemarch, who compensates for his greediness with 
overtly generous behavior.^' There is little to assure us that the criminal 
law is capable of overcoming these ambiguities in its effort to perceive 
the character of criminal offenders. 
This tension echoes the classical Dualist debate, with its Cartesian 
roots, in criminal theory. The Dualist debate centers on an oberver s 
(in)ability to determine a person's mental intent even in a singular 
action. Dualism, to simplify its different strands, holds that the intent of 
a criminal offender (or any actor for that matter) can merely be inferred 
from observable actions. Some have written convincingly that the 
Dualist position ignores the constitutive nature of intent and some 
actions (that is, some actions cannot be described without explicitly 
referring to intent).^^ Yet even if this is true for singular actions it 
certainly becomes more attenuated when another's total moral character 
is the subject of inquiry. 
This aside, the critique goes deeper than the classical Dualist 
debate. There, criticism remains focused on the proper interpretation of 
observable actions. The assumption has been that a person's actions are 
indeed driven by his or her character and we merely needed to correctly 
recognize the behavior. Modem behavioral science, however, 
increasingly indicates that the idea that a person's actions are merely a 
manifestation of her intemal character is naive. 
Behavior is affected by both psychological (intemal) and 
situational (extemal) factors. Hence, it may be impossible to 
confidently estimate a person's character from her behavior. This 
psychological critique undermines the clear path many would draw 
between character and acts. As Andrew Lelling notes, "character 
theories of excuse carmot accurately assign blame because they ignore 
situational details, and thus rely on character analysis that explains only 
a fraction of the behavioral story."^^ 
Acts, then, may not stem from a person's intemal character. The 
situational details of an event explain as much about how a person 
83 Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in CRIME, CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 29 
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1990). 
84 Anthony Duff, Acting, Trying and Criminal Liability, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL 
LAW 83-93 (Gardner and Horder eds., 1993); see also ANTHONY DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, 
AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY ch. 6 (1990). 
85 Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critique of Character-Based Theories of Criminal 
Excuse, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 35, 39 (1998). Lelling elucidates: 
The complex mixture of psychology and environmental variable that drives human 
behavior preclude[s] a theory of responsibility based on assessments of "character ... 
.Scientific psychology supports the conclusion that individual acts are as much the 
product of extemal, situational details as they are the results of intemal character traits. 
Id. 
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behaves as any internal traits. The reason we conventionally believe 
that people (including ourselves) have steady character traits, Lelling 
explains, is that we typically find people in a consistent set of 
situations.^^ Indeed, the perception of our own good character may 
suffer a rude blow if we were trapped in vastly different situations. 
If acts only partly stem from character then the attempts of the 
criminal law to find out who the good guys are and who the bad guys 
are break down. The conception of character as the internal drive is 
weakened. Further, to the extent that external situations may change, 
the picture of bad people manifesting their vices steadily over time is 
undermined. 
Most character theorists respond to the psychological critique of 
character controlling action rather elliptically. They construct a theory 
of character that measures an act as blameworthy only "to the extent" it 
reflects a person's character. Lacey, recognizing the artificiality of 
inferring character from a single act, asserts that criminal punishments 
ought to be imposed only where the act reflects the "settled disposition" 
of the actor.^'^ Single acts, she proposes, may provide some evidence, 
but do not always indicate settled dispositions.^® Thus only actions that 
are "truly representative" of the actor's character ought to be 
considered.®^ 
Vuoso also attempts to construct a sophisticated model of character 
theory that accounts for the indeterminacy of assessing character from 
acts. Vuoso argues that only "actions which are the result of a process 
of normal or undisturbed reasoning (the result of one's normal or 
undisturbed beliefs and desires), will generally reflect on the actor's 
character."®® For Vuoso it is only actions that are "determined by one's 
character" which are relevant.®^ Actions, he proposes, are determined by 
one's character where the "character" is the causal factor that figures 
most prominently in an accurate account of how that action came 
about.®2 Vuoso instructs, somewhat circularly, "if an action is caused 
Id. Importantly, Lelling does not limit his critique to obvious examples such as diuess and 
necessity (these are just the kind of excuses that character theorists claim work by denying 
attributability to character). Rather Lelling's claim is that, broadly, many situational factors may 
affect or control a person's actions. These factors may determine the law abiding or violating 
nature of a person's actions quite apart from our conventional notions of their character. 
LACEY, supra note 73, at 66. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 68. To be fair, Lacey does point out that actions which may seem merely unusual for 
an actor will still, despite their being rmusual, reflect the actor's settled disposition. See id. This 
may mean that she views only extraordinary (seizures, etc.) or non-attributable actions (duress, 
etc.) to not "reflect a person's character." If that is the case then her position begins to largely 
reflect that of traditional character theorists and the "settled dispositions" becomes a recasting of 
the basic assumptions of character theory. 
90 Vuoso, supra note 75, at 1672. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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by the agent's character, it is clear that it reflects on his character. 
The problem with each account is that it tells us little about how to 
discern the relationship between acts and character. To say that actions 
are only relevant to the extent "they reflect character," or "character 
causes them" is to beg the question. This is especially so in light of the 
cognitive psychological critique that character is reflected a great deal 
less by action than commonly believed. 
There is an alternative move that one can make in order to save 
character theory. One could argue that whatever the overall moral state 
of the offender's character the law may only punish the offender to the 
extent he revealed his bad character. This would be measured simply 
by the crime committed.^^ Because the law would then need only 
observe the portion of bad character evidenced by the crime the 
uncertainty of determining the offender's total character is eliminated. 
The problem with this argument is that it collapses character theory 
into act theory. If the law only need judge the actor's character to the 
exact extent revealed by the crime, then the focal point of punishinent 
remains with the act. To truncate character theory in this manner is to 
abandon it entirely. 
The contention is that the law cannot accurately assess character. 
Observation of acts tells us little objectively about underlying character. 
Identical acts may spring from different characters or be subject to 
different interpretations. Secondly, character may not drive action in a 
way that allows easy inferences from act to character. 
If the law cannot be accurate in its assessment it becomes 
impossible to premise punishment on character. For punishment to be 
based on character the law must be able to measure character at least 
accurately enough to "measure the just desert of the offender. The 
epistemological challenges illustrate that the law is unable to do so. To 
the extent one is unable to determine character from actions, character 
theory is indeterminate. Though the impulse to find and punish the bad 
guys remains it is impossible to truly determine who the bad guys are. 
93 Id. at 1674. Brandt, exploring this link, proposes: 
Is a person's motivation in any way related to his traits of character? ... We cannot say 
that every kind of motivation is an expression of character... but many kinds ot 
motivation are. In fact, any kind of motivation on account of which an action can be 
accounted reprehensible or morally admirable is of diis kind. It is plausible to 
suggest, in our definition of "reprehensible," that something can be reprehensible only 
if it would not have occurred but for defect of character. 
BRANDT, supra note 74, at 468. ^ . c c, 
94 This would recall the manner of arguing articulated by Professor Fletcher. See FLETCHE , 
supra note 24, at 800-02. 
95 Id. 
2004] G O O D  G U Y S  A N D  B A D  G U Y S  1041 
IV. ASSUMING THAT CHARACTER IS DETERMINABLE 
It is tempting to seek refiige in the epistemological uncertainty of 
immoral character. Yet still the most important question remains. Is 
empirical uncertainty the only reason not to punish for character? Is the 
only reason for the state to avoid creating a caste of permanent moral 
inferiors our uncertainty about who belongs in the caste? 
For the purpose of our moral inquiry let us leave aside the 
empirical issues of inferring character. Suppose that we know who the 
virtuous and wicked are. Imagine the following thought experiment. 
Suppose we are in possession of a perfect virtue meter that reveals the 
relative virtue and vice of every person. Now that we have defeated our 
empirical uncertainty, ought the state distribute punishment based on 
the relative moral worth of each individual? 
In this section we will examine the growth of legal equality even in 
the face of certainty concerning empirical inequality. That is to say, we 
will look at examples where the ideal of equality was advocated by 
those who felt, with the certainty of our hypothetical virtue gauge, that 
those being considered equal were of lesser worth. They could say that 
those weighed were considered factually (or empirically) unequal. That 
we now take issue with their measurements is not the focus. 
A word of clarification about what we mean by moral equality. 
Moral equality refers to premising a person's right to equal treatment on 
a factual comparison of the merit of two individuals. Here, we have 
been discussing the comparison of differing moral character. In a 
different example, we might determine that two people are equally 
entitled to equal government pay because of identical scores on a civil 
servants exam. Our belief in their right to equal pay does not come 
from an a priori belief in their equality as persons or state subjects (as it 
might were the example, say, welfare benefits). Rather it stems from 
their empirically proven equal merit vis-a-vis the exam criteria. Our 
current issue concerns premising punishment on moral inequality. Like 
the scores on the civil servants exam we now inquire about the 
relationship between a person's score on the virtue meter and their right 
to political equality. Even if we know some people have morally 
superior characters, how should this affect our vision of equality? 
The question, then, will be whether moral equality is the 
appropriate basis of political equality. Political equality, broadly stated, 
is the notion that the state owes each of its citizens equal respect and 
consideration.^® In the narrower field of criminal law, political equality 
describes equality before the law. Further, most liberal political 
Ronald Dworkin, In Defense of Equality, I SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 24 (1983). 
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theories reject the notion that equal respect is based on the quality of the 
citizen's moral character.Equal standing before the state instead 
becomes a fundamental principle and, as such, is difficult to justify. It 
can be seen as an a priori political belief.^^ Ronald Dworkin notes that 
this principle of equality is a value that precedes and cannot be based on 
virtue or moral merit.^^ Most importantly, Dworkin asserts, "It seems 
unlikely that it can be derived from any more general and basic 
principle of political morality.">oo Political equality presumes that the 
law will consider each citizen's interests to be of equal value."" 
97 Wojciech Sadurski, Theory of Punishment, Social Justice and Liberal Neutrality, 7 L. & 
PHIL. 351,371-72(1988/89). The author states: . x-u n 
nif we rest our political theory on a theory of the good (a conception of the morally 
good life, a prescription for a good moral character, etc.) which a state should enforce 
over other, competing theories of the good, then the criminal offender, in actmg 
contrary to this conception, harms himself.... ^ , 
But the liberal theory rejects perfectionism as a theory about the range ot state 
coercive powers... a liberal state assumes a neutral stance between the competing 
conceptions of the good; it abstains from enforcing one set of cntena of the morally 
good character over another.... This does not mean, naturally, that the state has to be 
neutral as between non-harmful and harmful (in the sense of postulatmg harm to 
others) moralities. 
Id. 
98 Dworkin, supra note 96, at 24. . . j ^t, „„,„i 
99 Id. at 35. Dworkin examines why a person's claim to equality cannot depend on the mo 
virtue of the citizen: 
[It is] hard to conceive how any of us could think that it matters more, from any kind 
of objective standpoint, how his life goes than anyone else's, if... each of us thii^ 
that the course of his own life has intrinsic importance. You might want to say, tor 
example, that it is more important how your life goes because you are a more virtuous 
person But your convictions about the importance of how your life goes are too 
deep-too fiindamental-to permit this ... . [It is] important how your life goes for 
some reason that... precedes your virtue. If so, then you cannot say that it is more 
important how you live for any reason drawn from your merit or the ment of your lite, 
and no other kind of reason can plausibly distinguish you from anyone else who has a 
life to lead. 
100 Id. at 31. Of course, other scholars have forwarded different grounds on which a view of 
the most basic equality can be based. Prominent among them is a religious (Judeo-Chnstim) 
basis of equality wherein God creating all men in his image is the underpinning for basic equality. 
SEE GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION (2001). 
101 To be sure there is a vast debate over the very value of the term equality m philosophic 
literature. Some scholars, most notably. Professor Peter Westen, have argued that a«e of 
equality is largely empty and confusing. See PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQU^ITY. 
ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF "EQUALITY" MORAL AND LEG^ DI^^^^^^^ 
(1990); see also Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. "7 (1982), Peter 
Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply, MICT. L. REV. 
604 (1983) [hereinafter Westen, Reply]. Westen argues that debates over "equal freatment are in 
fact only debates about equality in rhetoric and are in fact debates concemmg substantive nghts 
and legitimate criteria. , . , . 
To illustrate the point Westen uses the examples of a state where a height requirement in 
police recruiting leads to a disproportionately male police force. Westen claims that the tme 
argument does not concern equality as such but rather the legitimacy of height as cntena for 
police officers. If height is a legitimate criteria, then each citizen is treated equally in light 
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Ideals of political and legal equality have not expanded merely 
because it was thought that those compared were actually equal in 
merit. Rather the fidelity to equality has been evidenced most strongly 
when those compared were seen as unequal. Three examples will 
illustrate this point. First will be the decision of the American Founders 
to advocate an ideal of legal equality which prohibited titles of nobility. 
Their fidelity to equality existed notwithstanding their belief in the 
inferiority of the many. Likewise, the expansion of political equality to 
the former slaves was supported by Lincoln and other abolitionists 
despite their belief that Blacks were beneath Whites. 
By contrast we will see what happens when legal equality is 
premised on actual equality between people. The prime example of this 
will be Plessy v. Ferguson}^^ 
their respective height^ if it is not, then the state is treating its citizens unequally. 
Alternatively, one could conjure up a state were the citizens have been given the peaceable 
right to assemble but this right is in fact allowed only to the majority and denied to minority 
citizens. Here, again, the argument is not about the notion of equality but rather about the 
substantive right to assemble peaceably. 
Other scholars have argued against Westen's claim about the emptiness of equality. For a 
small portion of these debates, see Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to 
Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575 (1983); Anthony D'Amato, Comment, Is Equality a 
Totally Empty Idea, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600 (1983); and Jeremy Waldron, Jurisprudence and 
Political Theory: The Substance of Equality, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1350 (1991). 
In this article I take the position of the above scholars that equality as a concept is not an 
empty idea. For example. Professor Waldron points out that equality may be valuable as a range 
variable. A range variable tells us the set of criteria that one may weigh in making a decision. 
For example, while height may be important to enable police officers to be easily seen, for a 
society to advocate tall officers for the very purpose of reinforcing a masculine ideal of power. 
This would be outside the range of permissible considerations. Waldron, supra, at 1359-1360. 
Secondly, I believe equality has an independent weight to it quite outside of the substantive 
right. As Professor Greenwalt points out, where people are treated unequally the harm may not 
simply be in the denial of the substantive right. Rather the harm can be perceived as "magnified" 
solely due to the inequality. Two examples, one fanciful, the other more serious illustrate the 
point. Consider if the government handed out a single attractive T-shirt to each citizen. At the 
last moment, due to supply problems, the government decided it could only give each white 
citizen a T-shirt. I could well imagine my being outraged, as an Afiican American, despite the 
fact that my dresser is currently overloaded with T-shirts. It would certainly not be the 
substantive right to a T-shirt that would bother me; rather it would be the racial inequality 
evidenced by the program. 
One of Westen's arguments makes the point in a more serious manner. If the government 
enforced the right to peaceable assembly in a racially discriminatory manner I imagine it would 
be offensive not simply because of the substantive right but also because of the discriminatory 
treatment. Here I must disagree with Professor Waldron who proposes that while one could 
image the victim of this system being offended by the inequality, it would be the substantive right 
that carried the weight of the offense. Waldron, supra, at 1356. I view these as two totally 
separate harms and indeed, could imagine being more offended at the discrimination than the lack 
of the substantive right. 
102 1 63 U.S. 537(1896). 
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A. A Principled Equality: Equality Ungrounded by Empiricism 
Historical examples illustrate the importance of an idea of equality 
that does not depend on empirical proof of equality. Witness the 
commitment to abolishing titles of nobility in the American 
constitution. The United States Constitution prohibits the granting of 
titles of nobility by the government. The passage reads; "No Title of 
Nobility shall be granted by the United States: and no Person holding 
any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of 
the Congress, accept of any present. Emolument, Office, or Title, of any 
kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign state."'"^ The clear 
purpose was to prevent the federal and state governments from granting 
titles and establishing an American elite. The Founders wanted to 
prohibit the segregation of the population into a group of permanently 
privileged and inferiors. Though now an unquestioned part of our 
culture, doing so was not a forgone conclusion at the time.'""* There 
were places in the newly formed colonies where the populace had 
t u r n e d  a w a y  f r o m  d e m o c r a c y  t o  s e c u r e  a  s t r o n g e r  g o v e r n m e n t . I n  
Jamestown, the people had tumed to a dictatorial government to ensure 
strong command.i®^ Other colonial charters allowed for the granting of 
titles of nobility.'"'' After independence, some leaders wanted to install 
George Washington as a king.'"^ Questions as to whether to address the 
President as "His Excellency," "His Highness, the President of the 
United States and Protector of their Liberties"'"" or "His Most Benign 
Highness""" arose. Some called for the establishment of a European 
style American aristocracy.'" Others, of course, wished to install 
themselves as the nobility. 
To be sure, the establishment of an American nobility was 
unlikely."^ Americans were largely opposed to the idea of establishing 
a European style aristocracy."'' The opposition to this system was 
103 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
lO'l Jol A. Silversmith, The "Missing Thirteenth Amendment": Constitutional Nonsense and 
Titles of Nobility, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 577 (1999). 
105 Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245 (1983). 
106 Id. at 257. 
107 Silversmith, supra note 104, at 577. 
108 Karst, supra note 105, at 258. 
109 Richard Delgado, Inequality "From the Top": Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an 
Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32 UCLA L. REV. 100, 112 (1984). 
110 Karst, supra note 105, at 258. 
111 Delgado, supra note 109, at 111. 
112 W. at 112. 
113 /c/. at 111. 
11'l Id. It is true that Americans did not break away, wholesale, from European institutions. 
The common law system of estates was based in many ways on the European feudal system. Yet 
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rooted not simply in a sense of hostility towards the institution of the 
Monarchy. Rather, the opposition was grounded in a deep allegiance to 
a vision of republican government.Witness the words of James 
Madison in considering the prohibition of titles of nobility. Madison 
saw this prohibition as the comer stone of republican government."^ 
If the government, Madison forwarded, was to remain a republican one, 
that is a government "of the people," then titles of nobility had to be 
prohibited."^ This devotion led to the Constitutional prohibition on the 
granting of titles. 
Still, whether or not there were questions about establishing an 
American nobility, empirical doubts alone could not have carried the 
day. After all, the initial American political equality was not complete. 
The American elite at the time had little doubt in the superiority of 
certain people. Slavery was only the most obvious example. There 
were numerous other distinctions in Revolutionary America. To the 
Founders it was obvious that the landless, for example, were not 
properly fit to participate in govemment."^ 
Those early Americans did not doubt the intrinsic superiority of 
some portions of the population to the masses. Indeed, much of the 
disagreement over the form the govemment was to take was based on 
the Founders certainty of the general populace's inferiority.'^" 
Whatever the basis of equality under the law, the Framers certainly did 
not think it would amount to equality of the populace.'21 Marci 
Hamilton notes that the framers 
brought a jaundiced view of the people's ability to mle to the 
Constitutional Convention.... Indeed ... an utter disrespect for the 
people, who they characterized as "blind," uninformed, and 
on the whole, Americans rejected the European systems that would have replicated power 
hierarchies. 
115 Id. 
115 Delgado, supra note 109, at 111. 
1" W. A republican govemment describes a govemment where despite the lack of direct 
democracy, i.e., a referendum on every issue of govemance, the populace is govemed by elected 
representatives. Here, Madison is making a broader distinction between a republican govemment 
meaning a govemment mled by the populace by way of election and an aristocracy where a 
designated elite, the nobility, maintain control over the govemment 
"8 Id 
1" J. K. Cogen, The Look Within, Property, Capacity, and Suffarage in Nineteenth-Century 
America. \01 Yale L.J. 473 (1997). Note Cogen's observation that, "[w]hen the Federal 
Constitution was ratified in 1788, nearly every state required some form of property ownership in 
order to qualify for the vote." This requirement was often conceptualized as related to the 
internal worth of the citizen to cast a vote. Men who did not own property were seen as will-less, 
lacking in judgment, violent" and "corrapt;" the lack of property showed that a man was 
"indolent or vicious." In short, ownership of property was seen as a sure way of judging the 
worth of a man's character. Id. at 480. 
120 Marci A. Haimlton, Delegation and the Constitution: Representation and Nondelegation' 
Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 813 (1999) 
121 Id. 
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ignorant. . . .  [T]he debates at  the Consti tution . . .  strongly suggest  
that the Constitution rests on the presupposition that the people are 
not fit to rule by themselves. 
The Founders could not be said to believe that men were in fact 
equal. Madison said as much when he wrote, "there can be no doubt 
that the bulk of mankind are unequal, and ... must and will be govemed 
by those with whom they happen to have acquaintance and 
confidence."i23 Yet still they encoded a commitment, if incomplete, to 
notions of political equality.'^4 The franchise in earlier America, some 
estimate, extended to to seventy-five percent of adult white 
males. 125 Those early Americans believed, if in a limited sense, in the 
ideal of equality, i^^ The prohibition against titles of nobility separating 
the superior and inferior segments of society and the building of a 
widespread franchise were reflections of that ideal. Their fidelity to 
equality superceded their certainty about the inequality of men in fact. 
The most obvious example of the expansion of political equality is 
the gradual inclusion of the former slaves. Again, the diffusion of 
democratic principles was based on political rather than moral equality. 
The Thirteenth Amendment passed in 1865 prohibited slavery or 
involuntary servitude.Three years later, the Fourteenth Amendment 
would grant citizenship to all persons bom or naturalized in the United 
States.'28 This amendment further prevented each state from making or 
enforcing any laws that would "abridge the privileges or immunities" of 
each citizen.'29 Lastly, the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 prohibited the 
denial of the right to vote on account of race or color.'2" 
Most proponents of freeing the slaves and black suffrage did not 
believe in the equal social and moral status of the black slaves. Lincoln, 
for example, was able to forward ideas of white supremacy even while 
advocating political equality between the races. \^ile he believed in 
the political equality of Blacks, Lincoln did not support the idea of 
interracial marriage. Black jurors and much we now naturally consider 
part of being an equal citizen.'2' Even in the famous Lincoln-Douglas 
122 Id at 813. 
123 Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
355-56 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977). 
124 Karst, note 105. 
125 Id 
126 Id. 
127 U.S. CONST, amend. XIII, § 1. 
128 U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 1. 
129 Id 
130 U.S. CONST, amend. XV, § 1. 
131 Westen, Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. at 626. It is possible that Lincoln may have changed his 
mind by the time of Gettysburg. This, however, would be speeulative. Moreover, it is besides 
the point. Lincoln's position in the Lincoln-Douglas debates illustrates that he was comfortable 
supporting a vision of (limited) political equality for the black slaves without maintaining the 
view that blacks and whites were evaluatively equivalent. 
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debates Lincoln made clear his opposition to black suffrage.Certainly 
very few believed that Blacks were equal, on the whole, to Whites. 
Lincoln, like most Whites of his time, was convinced of the natural 
superiority of the white race.'^^ 
Nor was the Congressional passage of the Amendments premised 
on an image of true equality of the races.It is clear that the 
motivation to establish political equality among the races could not have 
stemmed from a belief in the actual equality of both. 
To be sure, there were abolitionists who believed in a richer 
equality between the races. Some believed that Blacks were not only 
entitled to political rights but were, in fact, morally equivalent to 
Whites. This version of equality was typically rooted in a deep 
religious conviction about the equality of men before God.'^^ But not 
all those advocating a political vision of equality between the races held 
the view of a God-given equality between the races. Still, those 
proponents of the rights of slaves continued to call for greater equality 
between the races.For them, equality needed no basis in the actual 
equality of the races, God ordained or otherwise. Rather, it was a legal 
equality, premised on the a priori belief in political equality that they 
sought to achieve. 
B. Precarious Equality: Empirically Premised Equality 
Historically, then, important advances in our concept of political 
132 Id. 
133 Karst, supra note 105. 
134 Id.\ see also John P. Roche, Equality in America: The Expansion of a Concept, 43 N.C.L. 
REV. 249 (1965). Further, Professor Fletcher notes that the passing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was due in large part to the desire to punish the South for its participation in the war. 
Consequently, section three of the Fourteenth Amendment aimed tb erase the political power of 
former Confederates by keeping them from office (lustration laws). Section four canceled any 
monies owed the Confederacy and outlawed compensation for the freed slaves. Additionally, 
President Johnson sought in a number of ways to use the lustration laws to destroy the power of 
wealthy southern land owners. Lastly, there was, of course, a political purpose for the Republican 
party insofar as the amendments promoted a large group of intensely loyal voters. See 
FLETCHER, supra note 100, at 86-87. Professor Fletcher does believe that despite this, a deeper 
tenet of equality, premised on a sense of equality before God, pervaded and drove the expansion 
of political equality following the Civil War. See id. ai 101-11. 
135 FLETCHER, SUPRA note 100, at 101-11. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. Some modem scholars have argued that, in fact, Lincoln had no genuine belief in 
equality. This interpretation of the Emancipation Proclamation views the dociunent as a product 
of irresistible political forces; a compromise Lincoln could not avoid. To whatever extent this is 
true Lincoln still had to couch the terms of the Emancipation Proclamation in compelling 
rhetoric. Whether Lincoln actually believed it, he was able to evoke a rhetoric of equality that did 
not depend on the equality in fact of both races. Lincoln was able to see that treating people as 
equal under the law did not depend on their being morally equal. 
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equality have been achieved despite presumed certainty of moral and 
social superiority of classes of people. Even where there was 
uncertainty the principle of political equality did not rest on this 
indeterminancy. Indeed, where principles of equality have been 
premised on factual equality the result has often been shameful. A 
contrasting example, the infamous Plessy, illustrates that the principle 
of political equality cannot depend on notions of empirical equality. 
Even in the face of presumed certain moral and social inferiority, 
preserving political equality is an important independent value. 
Plessy provides an explicit illustration of premising legal equality 
on factual equality.^s The case centered around whether a Southern 
Black, despite a statutory prohibition, would be permitted to ride in the 
same train car as his \^ite counterparts. In a decision that scarred 
American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court found that nothing in the 
Constitution prevented distinctions between the races, giving birth to 
the "separate but equal" doctrine.i^^ jhe majority held that the 
Constitution merely prevented legal handicaps based on race but that 
"mere[] legal distinction[s]" were not equivalent to legal handicaps.'"*'' 
Obviously, the justices failed to recognize the manner in which the 
distinctions created "badge[s] of inferiority."'4i 
But for our purposes Plessy^ s importance stems from its attempt to 
premise legal equality on distinctions of social and moral merit. The 
majority noted that the law could not prevent the recognition of factual 
differences between the races.The danger lay in the phrasing of the 
argument. Even while creating this doctrine, the majority ostensibly 
reaffirmed the political equality of the races. It was the natural and 
social differences between the races, however, that allowed for legal 
distinctions between the races. 1"*^ 
It was only Justice Harlan, in dissent, who recognized the true 
challenge of the case. Harlan recognized the badge of inferiority that 
attached when the state enforced separation between the races. 
Moreover, Justice Harlan understood that true political equality could 
never be based on natural or factual proof of equality. 
Harlan recognized that a caste of political unequals could not be 
justified by the existence of actual differences between the ftvo races. 
But his belief was not based on doubt about the proposed differences. 
Harlan himself professed to believe in the inherent superiority of the 
White race. Harlan commented: 
138 Plessy V. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
139 Id. at 544. 
140 Id at 543. 
141 Id. at 551. 
142 Id at 544. 
143 /rf.at 551-52. 
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The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. 
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and 
in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it 
remains true to its great heritage . . . 
This superiority, however, could not undermine a commitment to 
political equality before the law; "But in view of the Constitution, in the 
eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling 
class of citizens. There is no caste here."''*^ Harlan imderstood that 
political equality does not depend on empirical equality. 
Though our examples have been wide ranging, they all shed light 
on our original thought experiment concerning a perfect virtue gauge. 
We know that the Founders did not believe that all men were equal in 
fact. They were certain that some people were superior to others. Still, 
they forwarded an ideal of legal equality of persons. They prohibited 
the creation of a separate noble class not because of empirical 
uncertainty but because of political principle. 
The same applies to Abraham Lincoln and the expansion of 
equality for the former slaves. For Lincoln, legal equality was not 
based on an empirical claim concerning the equality of the Black race. 
In fact, Lincoln and his contemporaries were certain of the actual 
inferiority of the Black race. Nonetheless, he and others advocated a 
version of equality for the slaves premised on a vision of political and 
legal equality. Both examples illustrate how certainty concerning 
normative equality was ignored in order to affirm legal equality. 
By contrast, when legal equality is premised on factual equality we 
have seen distasteful consequences. In Plessy, the Court established a 
doctrine that allowed Black Americans to be subjugated to a lower 
class. It premised the legal distinction between the races on differences 
of merit between the races. In Plessy, the Court, certain of the empirical 
inequality in merit between the races, did not ignore the differences but 
used it as the foundation of legal (in)equality. 
The virtue gauge places us in the same position as Abraham 
Lincoln and the Founders before him. The virtue gauge turns us, in a 
real way, into Justice Brown with Plessy before us. A gauge that 
measures a person's moral fitness may allow us to be certain of the 
moral and social inequality of certain persons. We now have to decide 
if we are to base the legal equality of the morally lacking group on their 
moral inequality or if we are committed to a principle of equality that 
rises above empirical inequality. Virtue gauge or no, we must affirm 
the principle of legal equality. The only other alternative is to construct 
a political theory that recognizes political equality only where people 
are morally equal. 
144 Id. at 559. 
145 Id. 
1050 C A R D O Z O  L A  W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 25:3 
A principle of equality can only be affirmed if equality is not 
premised on empirical measure. Even were there an aristocratic class 
that was definitively nobler in America it would remain offensive to 
create a modem nobility. It would be ridiculous to attempt to marshal 
convincing evidence of the inferiority of Black Americans compared to 
White Americans. The findings would be obviously irrelevant to our 
commitment to equality. By the same token, it ought to be evident that 
a virtue gauge is equally irrelevant. Determining, even with certainty, 
the moral defectiveness of criminal offenders does not eviscerate their 
right to legal equality. A liberal legal theory is based on the idea that 
every citizen is entitled to equal respect of the state.''*® Even if we knew 
hardened criminals were morally defective, our commitment to political 
equality would supersede this. Whatever the basis of our punishing 
criminal offenders, it should not be because they are our moral inferiors. 
C. The Separation of Moral and Legal Equality 
Clearly, political equality (and subsequently legal equality) has not 
been based on moral and social equality. It may strike the reader, 
however, that this argument only condemns basing legal equality on 
certain types of criteria. It may be the case that legal standing ought not 
be based on, say, racial, social or intellectual equality. Moral equality, 
though, may be a different kettle of fish entirely. 
Even if other types of measures are an illegitimate basis on which 
to ground legal equality, might not moral standing be different? After 
all, do we not intuitively expect, even encourage, the state to take the 
totality of a person's moral standing into account in the criminal law? 
In punishment particularly moral standing does not immediately strike 
one as an illegitimate criteria in the way that race and wealth do. Why 
shouldn't moral merit trump political equality? 
Dworkin has already asserted that the principle of political equality 
necessarily precedes moral equality.'"^ Could punishment be a special 
case? Examining a legal paradigm based on the moral status of its 
citizens reveals its inadequacy. Let us return to our thought experiment 
wherein we have a perfect moral gauge. We subject two individuals, 
about whom we have our suspicions, to the meter. Subject A, the gauge 
reveals, is a man of unimaginably poor character. Hateful, mean, lustful 
and cruel. Subject B, amazingly, is yet still worse. He poses every vice 
in even greater quantity and is also in addition a coward. 
Being men of despicable moral standing, both men would like to 
146 Dworkin, supra note 96. 
147 Id 
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kill their respective spouses for insurance proceeds. Yet, despite his 
greater moral decrepitude, B is unable to do so. His cowardice gets the 
better of him. A, though not as immoral as B, is able to execute his plan 
and so his wife comes to an untimely demise. 
Despite B's greater immorality, it is A and not B we imagine 
subject to criminal punishment.That B is more immoral does not 
open him to criminal sanctions. Nor does certainty about their relative 
moral status change our inclination. The example simply illustrates that 
legal entitlements are superior to moral merit. It is easily noted that our 
punishing A and not B is succinctly explained by the act requirement or 
the harm principle. But this answer begs the question. Why the act 
requirement? It cannot be simply to evidence bad character, the virtue 
gauge is conclusive on this point. If one's intuition is that only A ought 
be punished it is because the act requirement grounds the recognition 
that criminal punishment cannot be premised on poor character. It must 
be because moral merit is subjugated to legal equality. 
A more subtle point needs be addressed here regarding the 
pervasiveness of character assessment in our criminal law. Benjamin 
Sendor raises one of the most common justifications for considering 
moral character in criminal punishment.While he agrees that 
character theory is flawed insofar as it seeks to make immoral character 
a criteria of guilt, he believes that character is a legitimate consideration 
in punishment. 150 But here Sendor is careful to make an important 
distinction. He notes that the character of a criminal defendant is 
relevant only insofar as it reflects the offender's tendency toward 
recidivism. 15' The distinction is an important one. It recognizes that in 
fact it is not moral character in any true sense that is censured. Here, 
the character as engine image is used once again as a proxy for the 
consideration of future dangerousness.i52 jg ^ot an idea of moral 
character or merit that is weighed. It is not the defendant's character per 
se but rather either his future dangerousness or cumulative harm that 
•48 It is not enough to say that the mere fact that A commits the crime proves he is more 
immoral. We can imagine a world in which B simply never has the opportunity to kill his wife or 
A commits the murder first and we must now distinguish their fimess for punishment. 
'49 Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 
10 N.D.J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 99, 126-33 (1996). 
•50 Id. 
•5' W. at 127. Sendor explains: 
A defendant's character clearly is an appropriate factor for the purpose of specific 
deterrence. If a review of the defendant's record shows that he is an inveterate 
recidivist—that he has a strong and enduring inclination to break the law—then that 
fact shows that previous intervention by the state has not deterred him from criminal 
activity and that more severe punishment is warranted in order to deter him from future 
criminal conduct. 
•52 Id. at 131. Sendor also notes that repeated criminal violations may increase an offender's 
desert. Again it is not the defendant's character that grounds his increased desert but rather the 
cumulative harm of the defendant's crimes that increased his desert. 
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increases his desert.Where the offender's dangerousness can be 
separated from his moral stature, character again becomes irrelevant as 
a basis of political equality. 154 About this there will be more to be said 
later. 
If moral merit is illegitimate grounds on which to premise 
punishment, then too are the moral measures revealed by the virtue 
gauge. Moral merit cannot trump a vision of legal and political 
equality. As the prior section has shown, the superiority of legal 
equality does not depend on empirical difficulties about the certainty of 
moral measurements. In the same way that intelligence, social merit 
and race do not affect our commitment to legal equality, neither does 
moral merit count. Even where empirically certain, armed with our 
powerful virtue gauge, our duty to treat all equally remains. 
V. CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND ACT THEORY 
This article began with a story that illustrated the impulse to divide 
the world into good guys and bad guys. We saw how there is an 
intuitive drive to dole out our blame and punishment on the premise of 
the good guy/bad guy distinction, whether it be in fairy tales, old 
movies or the law. That the law attempts to divide the world into good 
and bad guys is shown in the efforts of Character theorists to use 
criminal acts to divine immoral people. Knowing they are bad guys 
justifies punishing them and quells our compassion. We decide who is 
bad, then punish, imprison and marginalize them permanently. 
It turns out, however, the world is not made out of simply divisible 
good and bad guys. Film noir and modem cinema recognize this. In 
the real world it is harder still to discern who are the good and the bad. 
Actions may spring from different character traits. Further, they may 
only partially reveal character. Simply observing actions does not tell 
who is good and who is bad. 
But it is more than empirical imcertainty that prevents us from 
punishing people because they are bad. Even were it possible to 
determine the good and the bad, this would be inadequate grounds for 
political exile. Treating people as legal equals cannot depend on the 
153 Id. 
154 One cannot deny that an offender's dangerousness can seem difficult to separate in practice 
from views about his character. I do not pretend that the answer to this question is obvious. But 
two things bear keeping in mind. First, there will be instances where future dangerousness and 
character come apart presenting the philosophical question with which we started. The robber 
who suddenly comes into a great deal of money has not improved his moral standing but may no 
longer represent a future danger of robbery. Secondly, even where character and future 
dangerousness seem inextricably linked, it remains of value to remind ourselves that punishment 
remains focused on dangerousness and not the offender's immoral character. 
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assurance that one group is actually as good as another. The resistance 
to creating legally recognized groups of superiors and inferiors has 
endured even when the populace was certain that one group was 
superior. So it was when the Founders prohibited titles of nobility and 
when the former slaves were emancipated and later given the right to 
vote. The right to be treated as legal equals survived even though there 
was certainty that the emancipated slaves were, as people, inferior. 
These examples illustrate that legal equality should not be based on 
who we are. In the same manner one cannot premise legal inequalities 
on race, religion or intelligence, legal equality is inappropriately based 
on moral merit. Yet, it is obvious that some people will have their legal 
status altered. There are people who have their wealth sanctioned, their 
liberty restricted and, in extreme cases, their lives extinguished. Our 
fidelity to equality is not so unassailable that we are unable to abridge 
the liberty of some individuals through the mechanisms of the law. 
On what then, does legal equality depend? How and why do some 
lose their full gambit of rights? On what is the loss of legal equality 
based? What is needed is a constructive theory of punishment that 
addresses our preceding critiques. A theory that besides curing the 
empirical problems of punishing character protects a vision of 
fundamental equality between the punished and society. We need a 
theory of punishment that avoids concepts of permanent moral 
inferiority leading to the ossification of different castes. 
If desert is not measured by character then to what do we tum to 
premise punishment? The alternative is to focus criminal punishment 
not on what an act reveals about the actor's character but on the act 
itself. In this section we will tum from our criticisms of Character 
theories of punishment and explore act-based theories instead. Though 
slightly out of order, we will note how act-based theories address the 
preceding critiques of character theory. We will note how Act theories 
of punishment cure the empirical indeterminacy of character theory. 
Further, Act theories of punishment short-circuit the tempting 
distinctions between good people and bad people. By focusing on acts 
we avoid ready assumptions that character is fixed in an Aristotelian 
manner. This undermines the permanent exclusion and caste creation of 
Character theories of punishment. Most importantly, act-based theories 
of punishment, by refusing to premise punishment on an actor's moral 
merit, preserve the value of equality before the law. 
A. Act Theory and Criminal Punishment 
The major altemative to Character theories of punishment are act-
based theories. Instead of premising punishment on underlying 
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character—on who the criminal is—act theory instead focuses on the 
criminal action—^what the offender does.^^^ 
The focus of punishment in this paradigm is to sanction the actor 
for having autonomously committed a wrong.The modem 
incamation of act theory can be found in the work of Hegel. Hegel 
limited the locus of criminal punishment to the criminal act.'^^ The 
commission of a criminal act, an act that violates the legally protected 
interests of another, is the event that justifies the bringing to bear of 
state sanctions onto an individual.The commission of the act 
logically and necessarily implied the state's right (and need) to punish 
the offender. 159 The criminal act, the willed coercion of another, 
compels the punishment.*5" As Hegel puts, colorfully, in a note, "the 
Eumenides sleep, but crime awakens them; thus the deed brings its own 
retribution with it."*®* The act, not what it reveals, grants the state 
moral authority to assert jurisdiction over a citizen's life.*®^ 
Likewise, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. recognized that the state's 
right to punish was based on a criminal act. Holmes, in fact, 
deliberately eschewed the idea that law is interested in a citizen's 
underlying character. Holmes asserted that the law is not interested in 
how God will ultimately view each person. Instead, Holmes concluded 
that the theatre of the law is concemed with acts, external conduct that 
must be regulated.*®5 To be sure. Holmes thought that community 
morals played a place in criminal punishment but limited their role to 
determining the borders of the hypothetical reasonable man.*®"* These 
morals, he was sure to insist, are not the grounds on which punishment 
is determined: 
[I]t is already manifest that liability to punishment cannot be finally 
and absolutely determined by considering the actual personal 
unworthiness of the criminal alone... [it] is often assumed, that the 
condition of a man's heart or conscience ought to be more 
155 For a highly sophisticated view of choice theory, see generally MICHAEL MOORE, ACT 
AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (1993). 
For other modem views of choice theory, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
LAW 69-71; 191-92 (2d ed. 1995); Moore, jwpra note 83, at 31-40; and Stephen J. Morse, The 
Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, ^9 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247(1976). 
156 Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay on Choice, 
Character, and Responsibility, 67 IND. L.J. 719, 727 (1992). 
157 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood trans., 
Cambridge University Press 1991) (1821). 
158 Id. at 60. 
159 Id. at 120. 
160 Id. at 128. 
161 Id. at 129. 
162 Sendor, supra note 149, at 121-22. Though Professor Sendor recognizes that the criminal 
act is the premise of State sanction he refers to it as a "threshold" event. 
163 OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 49 (1881). 
164 Id at 50-51 
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considered in determining criminal than civil liability, it might 
almost be said that it is the very opposite of truth ... 
Instead it is the external act that is the focal point on which 
punishment is based. The measure of the underlying character could 
not he a consideration in the measure of criminal punishment: 
It is only intended to point out that, when we are dealing with that 
part of the law which aims more directly than any other at 
establishing standards of conduct, we ... find the tests of liability 
are extemal, and independent of the degree of evil in the particular 
person's motives or intentions.'®^ 
Hegel and Holmes each realized that criminal punishment is an 
exercise of the state's political power. The use of that power demands 
justification. Importantly, it is a political, not a purely moral 
justification that is needed. In law, that one may be morally deserving 
of punishment does not suffice to ground the state's power to punish. 
The first inquiry in the liberal state concerns the state's very right to 
punish. 
Where character is taken to be the basis of criminal sanction 
criminal law becomes proxy for punishment of one's immoral status. 
Where the law is primarily concerned with the judgment of an 
individual's virtue there is no built in reason not to punish for moral 
status alone. Again to assert that the law only sanction one's practical 
reasoning is to beg the question of why action is required to justify state 
punishment and prevent the pimishment of immorality alone. In other 
areas, the law has recognized that the state must be restrained from 
doing so. State power cannot be justified on one's status (moral or 
otherwise) but rather is based on an act. Yet both law and scholarship 
have had difficulty coming to terms with the distinction between 
leveling punishment for acts as opposed to status. One clear example of 
this can be witnessed in the struggle to understand the Robinson 
doctrine, which attempts to clarify just this distinction. 
The Robinson doctrine emerges fi*om Robinson v. California.^^'^ In 
that case a Los Angeles police officer stopped Lawrence Robinson on 
the street. After noticing needle marks and other indicia of drug use the 
officer arrested Robinson pursuant to a California statute that 
criminalized the status of being a drug addict.The Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction declaring it "cruel and unusual punishment" to 
directly criminalize Robinson's status.'®^ 
Though the Supreme Court in Robinson clearly struck down 
165 Id. at 49-50. 
166 Id. at 50. 
167 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
168 Id 
169 Id. at 667. 
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criminal punishment premised on a status alone, the Court itself, lower 
courts and commentators have experienced great difficulty m exammmg 
why this ought be true. The doctrine has been supported alternatively 
with the "status one cannot change," "involuntariness" of the status and 
the "pure status" rationales.!'''' 
The first two rationales, however, fail to lay a truly compelling 
foundation. That punishment ought not be invoked on someone because 
they occupy a status they cannot change or acquired the statos 
involuntarily is plainly insufficient. While this thinking may coincide 
with moral intuition, voluntariness does not explain why state 
punishment for status in unacceptable. 
Let us indulge in one last cinematic example. In the movie 
Trainspotting^'^^ a group of young heroin addicts decide to go clean. 
For the band it is an extraordinarily painful proposition. Another mate 
of theirs, though lacking their conviction, also decides to give up heroin 
merely to taunt the others with how easy it is for him. Though his 
friends experience tortuous withdrawal symptoms, for him forgoing the 
drug is a casual decision. Finally, when the group is overcome by their 
compulsion and return to the habit, he cheerfully joins, as casually as he 
each member of the group where later imprisoned under the 
same statue invalidated in Robinson, clearly all of their convictions 
would be invalidated. Similarly, were it known that Lawrence 
Robinson began his drug habit knowing that he would become addicted, 
the doctrine ought still apply.''^ Though voluntariness may figure into 
moral calculations of blame, the question here is one of political 
justification.!''^ 
Despite agreeing with the prohibition on punishing status, many, 
and certainly the Court, maintain the belief that state retains the power 
to punish violations of drug laws.''^ In any case, few think that the 
prohibition on punishing status extends to exempting all acts that may 
stem from a status.!'5 The Court's analysis clearly indicates that the 
no Julliette Smith, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for Expanding 
the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 293 (1996). 
ni SEE TRAINSPOTTING (Miramax 1996). , . „„„ 
172 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 687 (White, J., dissenting) (insinuating that the decision may 
well tum on the voluntariness of addiction). 
173 In the later Powell decision. Justice White points out the problem with prohibiting 
punishment of involuntary status but permitting the punishment of the acts they oompeh 
If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics, I do "ot see 
how it can constimtionally be a crime to yield to such a compulsion . [it] is like 
forbidding criminal conviction for being sick with the flu or epilepsy but permittmg 
punishment for running a fever or having a convulsion. 
Powell V. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968). 
174 Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664. 
175 Smith, supra note 170, at 330. 
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prohibition on punishing for status cannot be located in the 
volxmtariness of the status.'"'^ Rather, the prohibition on punishing 
status is exactly conceptualized by the Court as grounded in the need for 
an act that justifies the state's political power7'^ The Court's language 
is explicit: "The entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be 
inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, had engaged in 
some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing .. . 
Clearly, neither the voluntariness of the status chosen or the 
inability to remove oneself is sufficient rationale for the Robinson 
doctrine. The more compelling reason for prohibiting punishment 
under the Robinson doctrine is simply that the exercise of legal 
jurisdiction requires an act.''^^ Criminal acts, committed within a state's 
jurisdiction, are the very basis on which the state's power is premised. 
Simply being a drug addict, voluntarily or not, without committing an 
act does not justify state punishment. 
The question again centers on whether an act is appropriately 
punishable. The reason one cannot be punished for being Jewish, 
whether or not one voluntarily converted, is that being Jewish provides 
no basis for punishment. There is no action appropriate for state 
punishment. Likewise, the state cannot look to premise punishment of 
criminals on the very status of being immoral. Simply being immoral 
does not provide a basis on which the state's power may be premised. 
There is no Hegelian act which awakens the Eumenides. The state's 
authority is both premised and contained by the act. Choice theorists 
need not look underneath the criminal act to inquire further about the 
moral makeup of the criminal offender. 
Act-based theories of punishment are also critical in protecting the 
liberty of citizens from state interference.'^' Merely being a bad person 
is not enough to invite punishment. Nor is the general goal of social or 
moral education. Though punishment may be for an act that evidences 
poor character or flawed moral reasoning, state power is not premised 
on that character or flawed reasoning. The state needs a greater 
justification for imposing punishment.^ct theory preserves the 
'76 Powell, 392 U.S. at 532-33. 
177 M 
178 Id. at 533. 
179 To be sure, the act requirement here is not, as some have suggested, a shoring up of the 
requirement of proof. Smith, note 170, at 312-13. 
180 Pillsbury, supra note 156, at 719, 727. 
181 DRESSLER, supra note 155, at 70. 
182 See id. Hart also saw freely chosen acts as the locus of criminal punishment for different 
reasons. Hart felt focusing on choice was essential in preserving the fairness of law. Choice 
theory protected the capacity to control one's actions and predict the outcomes of those actions 
are important goods that the law must incorporate. When it is unclear if one can control 
becoming a bad person one is presumed, except in extraordinary cases to be able to conform their 
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delicate balance between the liberty of the citizen and the state s need to 
moderate action.Imposing sanctions only for chosen acts evidences 
society's commitment to individual freedom.'^'* By limiting the state s 
power to punish to the criminal acts, act-based theories reinstate the 
fundamental divide between political punishment and moral blame. By 
recognizing the irrelevance of moral character to criminal punishment, 
criminal law rediscovers the ideal of the liberal state. 
B. Act-Based Liability the Repair of Empirical Uncertainty 
It is worth noting that act-based theories of crime respond to our 
previous critiques of character theory, act-based theories both eliminate 
the empirical uncertainty of Character theories and undermine the 
creation of permanent castes. 
Primarily, an act basis of criminal punishment eliminates the 
empirical uncertainty previously explored. Legal punishment premised 
on the criminal action would no longer face the indetermmancy of 
inferring an actor's total moral character through her actions. As 
previously noted, the law has no accurate way of weighing a criminal 
actor's moral standing. Therefore the law properly restricts its concern 
to the more readily determined choices and conduct of offenders.'®^ 
By focusing on criminally liable autonomous choices the law 
recognizes the difficulty of truly measuring a person's character.!®^ 
Further, profoundly difficult questions concerning the extent to which 
character can be thought to truly dictate action would be less critical.is? 
C. Criminal Acts: Good Guys/Bad Guys and the Destruction of 
Permanent Castes 
Moreover, focusing on criminal acts alone blurs the all too easy 
distinction between good guys and bad guys. Act theory, we noted, 
focuses only on the prohibited actions of the offender and does not 
own actions to the law. By punishing only for the exercise of that ability choice theory presents 
all with a fair chance to avoid criminal sanction. Punishing uncoerced choices serves the law s 
duty of preventing social harm while allowing individuals the maximum ability to conttol their 
own destinies. See also George Mousourakis, Character, Choice and Criminal Responsibility, 39 
C.DED. 51,61-62(1998). 
1^3 Sendor, jwpra note 149, at 120-21. 
184 DRESSLER, ii/pranote 155, at70. ,n 
185 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 860-61 (George 
Chase ed., 3d ed. 1905) (1765-69). 
186 DRESSLER, supra note 155, at 70. 
187 Lelling, supra note 85. 
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explore underlying moral character. As a result, the law need not 
assume that the act is a result of or evidences bad character. 
Consequently, act theory sheds the notion that good people do only 
good and only bad people do bad things.'®^ 
Because we no longer have to assume that every criminal act is the 
result of bad character we are left with the unsettling truth that good 
people sometimes do bad things; that not all criminals are intrinsically 
different and bad people. The blurring of bright line heros and villains 
recalls our original discussion of film noir. Like Fritz Lang's Professor 
Wanley, we realize that criminals are not so easily separated into 
"them" and "us."i9o 
The lesson is illustrated by Moore's recounting of a real life 
murder case.^'^ Richard Herren managed to overcome tremendous 
socio-economic obstacles growing up in East Los Angeles to become a 
Yale graduate student. There he fell for Boimie Garland, an 
undergraduate, and became heavily committed to her and their 
relationship. After some time she sought to end the relationship gently 
and Richard felt mislead and hurt by her behavior. One night when 
spending the weekend at her parents house, Richard killed Bonnie. 
Though he intended to commit suicide afterwards, he did not. As 
Moore points out, no matter Richard's generally good character, 
focusing on his choice leaves no doubt that he is culpable.1^2 
Moore persuasively addresses the contention that Richard indeed 
had poor, even murderous character, that was merely hidden.If every 
bad action, even in light of the Character theorist's more general view 
of character, simply reveals a latent defect then character theory again 
becomes a different label for choice theory.Unless character is used 
to describe a broader "underlying moral character" or "settled 
disposition" of a person rather than attaching to any action the person 
Pillsbury, jMpra note 156. 
'89 This is the Aristotelian version of character earlier explored wherein character serves as the 
fundamental engine that drives peoples actions. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 28. See also Moore, 
supra note 83, at 47-48; Sendor, supra note 149, at 111-14; Joshua Dressier, Reflections on 
Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses, and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 
671,697(1987). 
190 THE WOMAN IN THE WINDOW, supra note 10. 
'91 The following recount can be found in Moore, supra note 83, at 52. 
'92 Id. at 52-53. Altemative explanations that rely on character to erase responsibility prove 
unpersuasive. The metaphysical objection that it was not really Richard that killed Bonnie (the 
act was so out of character, the argument goes, it can be conceptualized as having been 
committed by somebody else) is, according to Moore, held hostage to a very problematic theory 
of personal identity. It cannot be that as persons we are only responsible for actions we like. 
Further, the radical conclusion that actions that reveal a different character truly reveal a different 
person, essentially a separate identity that shares the same body is non-viable in a system of 
criminal punishment. 
'93 Id. at 53. 
'94 Id 
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actually commits character theory "collapses into choice theory 
Premising criminal liability on acts leaves us with a more subtle, 
and in some ways tragic, world. We must reach the disturbing 
conclusion that we are faced with a young man who on the whole 
possessed good character but committed an atrocious act. We must face 
the fact, in the same way film noir insisted, that people of good 
character do and are responsible for awful things. The world, after all, 
is not made up simply of good guys and bad guys. 
D. The Act Requirement and the Destruction of Caste 
Earlier we noted how premising criminal punishment on concepts 
of bad character naturally leads to a fixed and permanent view of a 
criminal caste. Imagining every criminal as possessing an inherent 
immoral makeup drives us to permanently exclude the offender from 
society. It is not surprising then that limiting our focus to the criminal 
act leads us in the opposite direction. Punishing criminal offenders for 
their acts as opposed to who they are undermines the notion of the 
offender as an untouchable pariah. To punish for permanent immoral 
character is to refuse to engage with the offender; where one is 
irredeemable, conversation has little purpose. By contrast, punishing 
the criminal's act embodies a respect for the criminal's rational 
capacity.'^^ In Hegelian terms the punishment responds to the will. The 
punishment respects the criminal's autonomy by holding him or her 
responsible.'^^ The criminal has chosen and consented, by the criminal 
act, to incur the punishment of the state.In this way, Hegel viewed 
the criminal as not merely deserving punishment but as having the right 
to be punished. 
By recognizing the offender's autonomous act the Hegelian focus 
on criminal acts undermines the separation between offender and 
society. In the words of Dubber, "Hegel . . . affirms the offender's 
membership in a community with all other members of society because 
the offender shares with them her rationality. "2®° Recognizing the 
rationality of the offender and engaging with their autonomous choice 
brings to the fore the commonality between the judge and the ones 
judged.^"' Punishing the criminal act intimates that the offender is a 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 126. 
197 Id 
198 Id at 127. 
199 Id at 126. 
200 Markus D. Dubber, Crime and Punishment: Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of Crime and 
Punishment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1612-13 (1994). 
201 Id. at 1603. 
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person whose choices are worthy of respect and not simply some 
disgusting moral creature to be punished simply for being sucL Again, 
Dubber points out the Hegelian focus on criminal acts addresses a 
modem society "which has come to deny its commonality with those of 
its members who have been accused or convicted of a crime."202 in this 
sense pimishment is used to reaffirm a common bond between the 
punishers and the punished.203 
Concentrating punishment on criminal acts disassembles the notion 
of a fixed caste in another important manner. A criminal act lacks the 
element of permanence that leads to exclusion. Examining the Hegelian 
model illustrates why this is so. In the Hegelian dialectic, punishment is 
not only logically compelled by crime but serves to negate the original 
crime as well.204 Punishment, Hegel makes clear, is that which cancels 
the original crime.205 in this, punishment is unlike compensation.^o^ 
Punishment renders the actual criminal act null and cancels its 
existence.207 
This metaphysical sentiment is captured in popular moral intuitions 
when society focuses on the criminal act alone. Focus on acts leads us 
to discuss a criminal's right to "pay her debt to society."2<'8 The idea 
here echoes perfectly the Hegelian notion. Once the crime is punished 
the criminal, rather than being permanently tainted, is restored. Sendor 
elucidates the comparison between the character and the act-based 
concepts of criminal law.^o^ After the crime has been punished, it ought 
not matter 
"if the defendant appears to have a bad character for law 
abidingness ... [he] should be free from state intervention .... The 
traditional metaphor used to accoimt for this mle is that by 
completing his punishment... a defendant has 'paid his debt to 
society'. If so, the ledger has been cleared and the state has not 
authority to intervene in his life, to consider whether he still has bad 
character. "21" 
Considering pimishment the nullification of the criminal arms us with a 
powerful argument against the permanent exclusion and political 
disenffanchisement that follows from character views of criminal law. 
Notice the contrast. In the Aristotelian "character" model 
consideration of bad character naturally leads to a concept of fixed and 
202 Id. at 1588. 
203 Id at 1580. 
204 HEGEL, supra note 157, at 120-130. 
205 Id 
206 Id at 124. 
207 Id at 128. 
208 Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1896. 
209 Sendor, supra note 149, at 123-24. 
210 Id at 123. 
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permanent immoral character.^'' In the Hegelian "act" model, 
concentration on acts naturally leads to the idea of cancellation and 
nullification of the offender's act.212 Punishment for acts imdermines 
the impulse to create a permanent caste. After punishment the crime is 
canceled, the criminal restored. 
VI. STATE JUDGMENT AND THE MORALITY OF HATRED 
Perhaps the preceding analysis misses the point entirely. In 
abstract philosophical analysis the case for act-centered retribution may 
be compelling. Translated into practice, however, it may be 
unattractive, or worse, miss one of the fundamental points of criminal 
law. After all, do we not expect the state to measure and prefer the 
actions of the law abiding to that of the criminal? Do we not want the 
state to level moral condemnation at the very people who attack, rape 
and murder innocents? Ought not the state evidence our moral 
contempt? 
Besides its inherent plausibility, this position resonates with 
important positions outlined by Professors Kyron Huigens and John 
Gardner. Drawing on Aristotle, Huigens proposes that criminal law 
cannot properly function without rejecting the illegitimate ends and 
flawed practical reasoning of those who commit criminal acts.^'^ in 
adjudicating a conflict between two citizens, the criminal law cannot 
defer the question of the good; that is, of the legitimacy of each actor's 
vision of the good. Inculpation then is necessarily an inquiry into the 
legitimacy of a criminal action and the moral soundness of that actor's 
reasoning.2''* This inquiry is, in turn, an inquiry into the actor's moral 
character.215 Further, the demand that others exercise sound moral 
(indeed virtuous) reasoning is a necessary part of the political exercise 
which demands that each person conduct herself with due regard for the 
employment of rationality.^^® Engagement in this reasoning as it is 
reflected in the necessary enterprise of human politics and adjudication 
is in itself a necessary element in realizing the full worth of man's 
development, the full engagement of Aristotle's quality of human 
rationality, the Ergon.^'^ 
Huigens presents an elegant argument for the consideration and 
211 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 28. 
212 See HEGEL, supra note 157. 
213 Huigens, supra note 26, at 1430, 1446-47. 
214 Id. at 1436-37. 
215 Id. at 1448-49. 
216 M at 1469. 
217 Id at 1444-45. 
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assessment of virtuous moral character into the body politic in general 
and criminal law in particular. What he fails to properly weigh, 
however, are the special moral duties of the state which make 
illegitimate the particular form of inculpation and blameworthiness that 
are quite appropriately part of our personal moral assessments. Unlike 
private individuals, who must exercise their moral capacity in assessing 
and judging the moral fitness of those around them, the state owes each 
of its citizens a duty of equal respect. This duty of equal respect 
extends even to one who holds a shallow conception of the good or 
refuses to engage in the pursuit of their own greater realization. After 
all, one's lack of virtue may exist quite without abridging other's rights. 
Nor is the mere indeterminacy of one particular vision of the good a 
reply, for the singular pursuit of money, power or sex at the cost of all 
else must surely be recognized as a sMlow conception of a fully 
realized human life. Further, were one to withdraw from the enterprise 
of constructing a fully realized life at all (deciding to spend one's life 
counting the number of bricks in Manhattan) we must again admit the 
paucity of some conceptions of the good. Still, where one's moral 
character is inferior to another's but where it does not result in 
abridging other's rights, a person may demand of the state equal respect 
for their own autonomously formed conception. This special duty of 
political morality restrains the state from inquiring into the full measure 
of one's character. 
Huigens ignores that the moral good realized from the private 
endeavor to engage in political life may be importantly asymmetrical. 
The pursuit of and full development of one's human capacities may 
require the engagement in the enterprise of human politics. Further, 
though the state and society as a whole can only remain vital where the 
enterprise is pursued, the state may be restrained from requiring the 
engagement of this virtue. Still, if the state is to respect its duty of 
equality, it is restrained from imposing on a citizen even that version of 
engagement in the political enterprise through which that person's 
rationality is fully realized. 
On the other hand, Gardner notes that straining to fit the criminal 
law into one of its classical philosophical rubrics ignores one of its basic 
rationales. Criminal law, Gardner posits, exists in large part to displace 
the unfettered violence that vengeful private individuals (and their 
family and friends, etc.) would seek if it did not exist.^i^ The criminal 
law, if it is to quell the vendetta, it must replace with words, symbols 
and punishment the moral fire and anger citizens feel towards those who 
John Gardner, Crime: In Proportion and in Perspective, in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 31-32 (Andrew Ashworth 
& Martin Wasik eds., 1998). 
1064 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 
have wronged them.^'' The law itself must evidence moral 
punativeness in order to monopolize or surrogate private hatred. 
Replacing private hatred and moral condemnation is in large part the 
point of criminal law.^^o 
Gardner recognizes the inherent tension in which the legal 
apparatus is placed. While the law must attempt to subsume the 
vendetta it cannot become identical with it. Criminal law must stop 
short of institutionalizing the hatred it seeks to replace. Unlike private 
individuals, who may justifiably hate those who have hurt them, the 
state owes a strong duty of humanity to all, including criminal 
offenders.221 The state must stop short of vengeful excess and affirm 
the humanity of victim and offender alike. Nor can the state allow the 
offender to be cast away, becoming forever a pariah.222 
The tension to at once symbolize private moral anger while 
heeding the state's political duty to treat each citizen with equal respect 
has become greater in recent times. As cruel and humiliating 
punishment has become removed from public view greater pressure has 
been put on the trial to become the symbolic rite of public scorn. This 
heavy symbolic burden, difficult at any time, has become almost 
impossible as the legitimizing rituals of law become increasingly 
disregarded.223 As a result, the criminal law as a dam to private 
morality comes under strain from all sides. 
In the face of this it is little wonder that we feel a collective 
impulse towards greater character condemnation not less. We harbor a 
private, justified moral anger towards criminal offenders. When the 
sjmibolism of the criminal trial seems unsatisfying we wish to inject 
more personalized moral outrage into our criminal sentences. 
Increasingly, we seek to capture our moral outrage of the criminal in 
supplemental sentences, isolating the offenders and casting them out of 
society. 
Yet, the state is duty bound to resist clamoring for revenge. 
Private citizens may rightfully hate; the state may not. Private citizens 
may seek personal moral condemnation and revenge while the state, 
duty bound to respect each of its citizens equally, must not succumb to 
the call to condemn and marginalize the character of any, including 
offenders. To the extent the state departs from this and indulges in the 
public vengeance it fails to fulfill its duty to affirm the humanity of all 
citizens.224 Though difficult, we are forced to realize that the state is 
219 Id. at 33. 
220 Id. at 31. 
221 Id. at 48. 
222 Id at 34-35. 
223 Id. at 50. 
224 7^/. at 35, 51. 
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bound by duties of political morality and the justice the victims desire 
may not be the justice that the courts may provide.^^^ 
Lastly, our impulse to foster state-sponsored moral condemnation 
ought to be tempered by the terrific cost. Where the state sponsors the 
condemnation of an offender's moral character it collaborates in the 
creation of an immoral caste. Criminal offenders, as explored above, 
become forged into an image of permanent immorals, to be 
continuously shunned. When this image interacts with other stereotypes 
of race and class the danger becomes greater still. These are the dangers 
avoided by our adherence to the principles of equal respect for all. 
CONCLUSION: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE UNDER AN ACT REGIME 
Over the course of this article we have explored the differences 
between legal concepts of punishment based on a criminal offender's 
underlying moral character and punishment based solely on unfettered 
choice of an offender. I have argued that it is wrong to view criminal 
punishment as based on the underlying character of the offender. 
Character-based theories are empirically uncertain, lead to the creation 
of moral castes and violate the principle of legal equality. By contrast, 
act-based theories of punishment avoid empirical uncertainty, 
undermine the concept of permanent immoral character and preserve the 
value of equality before the law. 
To this point I have been concemed with how we view those we 
punish. The argument has remained mostly philosophical. The concern 
has been the intellectual flaws in character theory and the importance of 
protecting conceptual values and ideals of equality. Though these 
values are of the utmost importance it bears reminding that the way we 
imagine criminals has real world effects. 
To conclude our consideration let us examine the real world effects 
of changing the way we view those we punish. This means exploring 
the changes that an act-based theory demands of us. Moving away from 
character theories of the law means erasing the legal penalties that are 
based upon and meant to reinforce the image of criminals as 
permanently stained. 
The most dramatic of these legal sanctions is current growth of the 
"Three Strikes and Out" punishment regime. This regime entirely 
forgoes the deliberative processes of establishing punishment calibrated 
on the criminal's retributive desert.226 The regime assumes that the 
appropriate retributivist reply to any three felonies is permanent 
225 Id, at 49. 
226 Fletcher, supra note 32, at 1896. 
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incarceration. Yet, we know from the ever-growing anecdotes that not 
every person who commits three felonies deserves a lifetime in prison. 
Given the proliferation of offenses that fall under federal felony stages 
this inference is unwarranted. Surely, the stories of offenders 
imprisoned on a bounced check as a third felony hardly qualify for h e 
sentences. Most importantly, the very construction of the regime shows 
a refusal to even consider the individual desert of each offender. 
Abandoning character views of punishment means the law can no 
longer throw masses in prison premised on the view that they are 
irredeemably immoral people. 
The permanent disenfranchisement of felons is yet another 
sanction that expresses the marginalization of those we punish. As we 
saw, arguments that imagine criminals as a threat to "the purity of the 
ballot box" are based in a view of the criminal as metaphysically 
contaminated.227 Erasing this image undercuts the rationale and leaves 
little reason for felon disenfranchisement. Disenfranchisement then 
would be appropriate only for those crimes were the retributivist desert 
would call for permanent loss of voting rights.228 jhe widespread use 
of political banishment merely as a sign of permanent condemnation 
dissolves when character is removed. Once the criminal has paid his 
debt to society, his voting rights, and with it the indication that he is 
"the political equal of every other," must be restored.229 
Similarly, the collection of collateral sanctions that are markers of 
the permanent subjugation of ex-felons naturally fall from the legal 
landscape under an act paradigm of criminal punishment. Sanctions 
that deprive ex-felons of social and welfare benefits as well as exclude 
them from a vast segment of the workforce would all need to be re­
examined in light of the specific retributivist desert of each act. It is 
improbable that many of these sanctions would withstand such scrutiny 
and impossible to think the wholesale imposition of them c^ be 
justified solely under a retributivist scheme. How, after all, could being 
denied the ability to borrow money for education be a proper 
punishment for a long ago robbery? Further, the permanent nature of 
these sanctions, driven by the impulse to systematically and 
permanently exclude ex-offenders from society can no longer be 
supported. x j 
This is the challenge of premising criminal punishment on acts and 
not character. It is a difficult challenge. Being human, we are given to 
228 One can imagine crimes where disenfranchisement fits the specific retnbutivist desert of 
the crime. In the same way repeated violations of the Motor Vehicle Code may warrantee 
revocation of a driver license so too repeated violations of, say, voting laws may compel 
revocation of a person's voting privileges. 
229 Hampton, 5M/?r(3 note 43. 
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making moral judgments about others' character. We base a great deal 
of our personal affections, admiration and blame on these judgments. 
We harhor cravings for a simple world where there are good guys and 
bad guys; a world where we know that good people do good and that 
the bad are punished. 
When we translate our personal blaming practices into the criminal 
law, however, things go horribly awry. We being to assume that those 
who are pimished are unifaceted bad people and that the awesome 
power of the state should, replicating the personal sphere, make them 
pay for being bad people. We ignore the critical difference between 
what is legitimate in personal moral judgment and political morality. 
We ignore the nagging truth that the state ought not permanently 
segregate and punish people because they are bad. When we premise 
punishment on character we give in to our thirst to get the bad guys. 
Though it is onl;^Whuman, it quickly allows us to forget the common 
humanity of those we punish. 
